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I. INTRODUCTION
Surely it is within the Central Asian regions of Russia, and the Central Asian
borders of Russia, that the real problems of the immediate future are coins to
develop. Chester Wilmot, 1952. fRef. l:p. ii]
Soviet Central Asia poses a definite challenge to the domestic stability of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is a multi-ethnic community of over one hundred
different ethnic groups and nationalities. Yet one particular transethnic group, the
Soviet Muslim population appears unwilling to turn from its national and cultural
identity and assimilate within the "Soviet" culture. Thus the Soviet State of over 262
million people (according to the offical Soviet census of 1979) faces an active cultural
resistance among its 43 million Soviet Muslims. The vast majority (i.e., 75 percent) of
the Soviet Muslims are concentrated in Soviet Central Asia or what was formerly
called Tsarist Turkestan. This cultural challenge appears strongest among these
Muslim peoples in part because of the geographic contiguity of the four Socialist
Republics of Central Asia proper, their common historical and religious background,
their common position as part of the Soviet Union's periphery, and the presence of
fellow Muslim co-ethnics across the border in Afghanistan and Iran. Yet the nature of
-this challenge is ill-defined by Western experts who neglect to frame the challenge in
Soviet Central Asia is the region occupied by four Soviet Socialist Republics
(SSRs): Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Tajiks. Kazakhstan is not normally included
as part of Soviet Central Asia proper.
^According to Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, two experts on Soviet
Muslims,
in the USSR, the term "Muslim" is generally used to describe a people who
before the 1917 Revolution belonged to the Muslim religion and culture. It has,
therefore, a national and cultural significance beyond the purely religious one.
[Ref. 2:p. 1]
This author considers the term "Muslim" to be a term of national identity. In
attempting to define the nationality of Central Asians, a transethnic term such a
"Muslim" or even "Turkic peoples' may prove more useful and accurate than the
contrived ethnic identities applied by the Russian Bolsheviks to Turkestan. In
identifying the relationship between Russian ethnicity and national identity there is no
such separation — ethnicity equals nationality. The offical Soviet state position is to
equate these two — ethnicity and nationality — as well.
8
theoretical terms. In fact, the voluminous literature written by Central Asian experts
concerning this challenge deals primarily with the particularistic problems facing the
Soviets in the region (i.e., demographics, cultural assimilation, national identity, Islamic
revivalism, and nationality power). The vast majority of this writing is descriptive or
historical or both, emphasizing a particular problem or set of problems from a
nontheoretical perspective. This extensive literature is void of any universalistic theory
that can both encompass the particularistic problems that Central Asia poses to the
Soviet state and provide the essential framework for their discussion and analysis.
Such a framework will allow analysts to achieve not only a more accurate description
and explanation of the challenge, but also a better prediction and prescription as well.
The purpose of this paper is to establish a neo-Gramscian theoretical
perspective for discussing the particularistic problems of Central Asia. In this light, the
Soviet Central Asian challenge is a counterhegemonic challenge to the hegemony of
Russian nationalism and Russian communism. Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony
and counterhegemony explains the mechanism of rule essential for group control of a
state as well as the mechanism of revolt required to permit a subordinated group to
stage a social revolution. Therefore, this analysis will look at the challenge from the
perspective of revolutionary theory. First, this paper will establish a neo-Gramscian
theoretical base from which to examine both Russian hegemony and Central Asian
counterhegemony. Second, the Soviet Union will be analyzed as an hegemonically
ruled state. Since any revolution is primarily a challenge directed against a state's
ability to affect and maintain its rule, our understanding of Russian hegemony is key to
clearly perceiving the importance of this challenge. Third, the concept of
counterhegemony will be applied specifically to Soviet Central Asia where a developing
Muslim counterhegemonic movement is taking form. This movement, using Gramsci's
alternative revolutionary strategy, can serve as a mechanism for revolt against the
Russian ruled State. Soviet Central Asian counterhegemony revolves around two
vitally important themes: Muslim nationalism and the Islamic religion. By analyzing
the Central Asian challenge from this perspective, we can not only place the
This paper is classified as a "neo-Gramscian" analvsis rather than a "Gramscian"
analysis because the author has broadened original Gramscian theory beyond its
traditional economic foundations, and has chosen to emphasize the thcorv's
non-economic factors. As a result, a neo-Gramscian perspective permits the
application ol Gramsci's theory concerning the state and social revolution to societies
where the dominant social division is not liorizontally stratified economic classes, but
rather verticallv stratified nationality groups.
particularistic issues of Central Asia in a larger, more universalistic theory, we can take
a different, often overlooked "analytic cut" at a problem which may ultimately
undermine both the Russian's hegemonic rule and the stability of the Soviet state.
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II. COUNTERHEGEMONIC IDEAS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, politician, and journalist never composed a
systematic work or left a completed theoretical thesis. Nevertheless, this former
co-founder of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) articulated a "Marxist science of
political action" which is still relevant today [Ref. 3:p. 65]. For Gramsci, "politics is the
central human activity" by which an individual comes into contact with his world.
[Ref. 4:p. 23] Gramsci, in the years following World War I, saw the failure of a
workers' revolutionary movement in Italy. The traditional Marxist strategy of
revolution failed to account for the stability of the bourgeois class in the Italian state.
As a result, he conceptualized an alternative Marxist view of the State as the entire set
of activities with which the ruling class or group "not only justifies and maintains its
dominance, but [also] manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules."
[Ref. 4:p. 244]. With the State defined in hegemonic terms, he was able to develop an
alternative strategy for its revolutionary overthrow - subordinate class
counterhegemony.
A. A NONMARXIAN APPROACH
Nonmarxists have often overlooked Gramsci's theory and revolutionary strategy
due to his emphasis on achieving a successful proletarian (i.e., class based) revolution.
Gramsci's works are well known and respected within Marxist circles but are
undervalued in non-Marxist circles. Joseph Femia, in a review article on "Gramsci's
Patrimony," asserts that "no Marxist thinker, apart from Marx himself, is so
universally respected and admired as Antonio Gramsci, one of the originators of what
Merleau-Ponty called 'Western Marxism.'" [Ref. 5:p. 327] Yet Gramsci's works
transcend the Marxist theoretical milieu. His conceptualization of the hegemonic state
and his alternative revolutionary strategy can be invaluable to non-Marxist analysis.
Gramsci, despite his historical materialist4 perspective, does attribute importance to
non-economic factors like ideology, ideas, values, beliefs, culture, and politics. By
An historical materialist is one who acknowledges that beliefs arise from the
economic base of society (i.e., a specific mode of production) and in some sense reflect
it [Ref. y.p. 347]. An historical materialist, like Marx or Gramsci, considers the mode
ol production as the dominating factor in social relationships, social organization, and
social ideas.
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broadening Gramscian theory beyond its original economic foundation, the author
does not compromise either the strength or validity of Gramsci's concepts of hegemony
or his alternative strategy of revolution.
The key to applying Gramscian or neo-Gramscian theory is to make the
distinction between dominant and subordinate social divisions within a society. These
social divisions can reflect a predominance of either the horizontal or vertical
stratification of civil society. If these social divisions are economically determined, as
they were for Gramsci, then the divisions reflect the horizontal stratification of society
and are called "classes." If, however, those divisions are not economically determined
or do not reflect horizontal stratification, then the term "group" is far more appropriate
to describe the vertical stratification of society. In reality, within any society both
vertical and horizontal divisions exist simultaneously. While in some societies the
dominant division of control and intersocial cleavage is class-based (i.e., a horizontally
stratified society), in other societies (i.e., a vertically stratified society), these divisions
can be primordial-based (e.g., family, clan or tribe) or ethnic-based (e.g., national
identity). As such, the important characteristic for applying Gramscian or
neo-Gramscian theory to a particular society is to identify the dominant social division
of control and intersocial cleavage. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms "class"
and "group" will be used interchangeably, reflecting differences between authors, and
will imply the dominant social division appropriate for a particular society.
B. HEGEMONY AND THE STATE
1. Hegemony: A Mechanism for Rule
Gramsci's theory of hegemony, set out in his unfinished work Prison
Notebooks, "is founded on a simple premise: that modern man is not ruled by force
alone, but also by ideas." [Ref. 5:p. 346] Thus, the dominant ruling group does not
have to rely solely on physical domination to maintain their ruling position. It is
possible to ideologically co-opt subordinate groups into maintaining the ruling status
quo. The subordinate groups, or those who obey the State, do so willingly - whether
Gramsci himself was openly hostile to those who approached revolutions from
an "internationalist" perspective. He defended the national character of revolutions
and insisted that revolutionary strategy be adapted "to real men, formed in specific
historical relations, with specific feelings, outlooks." [Refs. 5,6:pp. 351,198]
Nevertheless, he still considered the dominant social division to be determined by the
specific economic structure of the society and the particular mode of production. As a
result his writings reflect an emphasis on horizontal class analysis, not vertical group
analysis.
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completely or in part - because they perceive reality through the conceptual framework
of the dominant class. As a result, individuals who should be alienated by and
contending against the State (e.g., proletarian individuals in a bourgeois-dominated
State) are in fact not alienated. Gramsci considers the subordinate groups to have
"bought into" the social vision of the dominant group, sharing both their values and
standards in common. Subordinated groups can then be exploited by the dominant
group and yet not perceive their exploitation because they accept the dominant
"Weltanschauung." This ideological predominance of the dominant group leaves
subordinate groups passive towards revolution and willing to "wear their chains."
Hegemony is a mechanism for social rule often overlooked by the Marxists
prior to Gramsci. While it is true that "the Russian Social-Democrats at the
turn-of-the-century frequently used the term "gegemoniya" implying the hegemony of
leadership of the proletariat over other potentially revolutionary classes, pre-Gramscian
concepts of hegemony lacked the idea of cultural ascendancy. Gramsci broadened the
concept of hegemony from political leadership within an alliance of revolutionary
groups and used it to define a "mechanism of rule applicable to any set of social
relations where one group holds sway." [Ref. 5:pp. 346-347] The cultural ascendancy
of the ruling group serves as the mechanism of rule for the society and allows for
group dominance within the society [Ref. 7:p. 473]. While Marx and Engels in The
German Ideology recognized that the ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling
class, they failed to appreciate the role of noneconomic factors in achieving social
dominance. Marx recognized that in a bourgeois society, the mechanism of class
exploitation was the capitalist mode of production (i.e., private property). But Marx
did not see noneconomic factors like ideology and culture as essential to bourgeois
rule. As a result, the class struggle was limited to the economic and political level.
While Marx explained why the proletariat ought to revolt, Gramsci specified why they
probably would not. Giuseppe Fiori, in his book Antonio Gramsci, Life of a
Revolutionary, explains Gramsci's contribution to Marxism and revolutionary theory
this way.
Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lay partly in his conception of the nature of
bourgeois rule (and indeed of any previous established social order), in his
argument that the system's real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling
class or the coercive power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance bv the
ruled of a "conception of the world" which oelones to the rulers. The philosophy
of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to
emerge as "common sense": thatls, the philosophy of the masses who accept the
morality, the customs, the institutionalized behavior of the society they live in.
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The problem for Gramsci then is to understand how the ruling class has managed
to win the consent of the subordinate classes in this way; and then, to see Ifow
the latter will manage to overthrow the -old order and bring about a new one of
universal freedom. [Ref. 7:p. 238J
Giuseppe Fiori highlights a fundamental principle of hegemony: it permits the
dominant class or group to affect their rule using consensus rather than coercion. 6 Two
questions arise from this observation. First, if hegemony permits consensual rule, what
effect does this have on traditional Marxist-Leninist theories about the State? Second,
what are the hegemonic apparatuses which permit the dominant group or class to
effect consensual rule? After all, these apparatuses allow the dominant group "to
establish its view of the world as all inclusive and universal, and to shape the interests
and needs of subordinate groups [or classes]." [Ref. 3:p. 70]
2. The State: Consensus and Coercion
Gramsci's conception of the State differed from the classical Marxist and
Leninist conception. For Marx and Lenin "every state is a dictatorship based upon
force and coercion." [Ref. 3:p. 347] As a result, they conceptualized a conflict model of
society, dominated by class struggle. The State represented only the ruling class which
waged a class war based on coercion and force against all its class enemies. As a
dictatorship, the State would punish those who reject its authority, violate its rules or
challenge its fundamental foundations. The State, as an instrument of the ruling class,
used fear to maintain social stability. Thus, the economic infrastructure of society (or
base), called the mode of production, permitted a specific class to dominate its class
enemies through physical despotism. As long as a capitalist economic infrastructure of
society existed, a "dictatorship of the bourgeois" would affect State rule. Even after a
proletarian revolution established public ownership of property as the economic
structure of society, the state would remain a dictatorship. In a socialist society, it
would be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" aligned with its class allies - the peasantry -
using coercion and force against its class enemies - the remaining bourgeois elements.
Only after the bourgeoisie elements were removed and class conflict ended would the
State begin to wither away. But the nature of the State never changed; it only
atrophied away due to a lack of use in a society absent of class conflict.
While this consensus rule may appear similar to a "social contract", for Marxists
it is a social contract in err. Historical materialists insist that even if the proletariat
consent to bourgeoisie rule, that consent is err and only prolongs their class aberration.
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Gramsci, while accepting the premise that every state ultimately functions as a
"dictatorship", also recognized that different forms of rule existed beyond the classical
Marxist interpretation of the State. Western societies, like Italy, were able to maintain
a high degree of internal cohesion among class enemies. This cohesion produced a
social stability unexplainable by the conflict model, or the use of coercive force.
Gramsci postulated that the obedience of the Italian proletariat to a state operating in
opposition to proletarian interests was not garnered by fear but by integration. The
masses, through hegemony were morally and culturally integrated into the state as a
result of the cultural despotism and hegemony of the ruling class - the bourgeoisie. In
this context, the State serves as an "educator" instructing the masses in the beliefs and
values of the dominant group. The real struggle within society is the struggle for
consciousness between the dominant and subordinate groups in the society. And an
educator state, serving to affect hegemony over the consciousness of the masses, can
produce mass consensus in favor of the dominant culture. Thus, Italy and other
Western societies illustrated for Gramsci a consensus model of society.
For Gramsci, both models - consensus and conflict - are required to explain
the State. The vast majority of the masses consent to and are integrated into the
hegemony of the dominant, ruling group. Hence, the State functions chiefly as an
"educatorship." Therefore, the primary role of the State is as a hegemonic apparatus,
expanding the cultural dominance of the ruling group over the masses. Yet, not all of
society will consent to their integration into the ruling group's value system. This
"fringe" minority of society maintains a conflictual relationship with the ruling groups,
rejecting both their rule and their dominance, especially in the arena of consciousness.
As a result, the State must also function as a "dictatorship" against these fringe
elements and use coercion, force and fear to affect its rule. Otherwise, the coercive side
of the State remains covert or in the background, acting only as a vehicle of
enforcement and threat. Using this approach, the Gramscian state is primarily an
"educatorship of the dominant group" effecting its rule through "hegemony" over a
primarily "consensus model of society." In a secondary, more limited capacity, the
Gramscian State functions as a "dictatorship of the dominant group" affecting its rule
through "coercion" over a lesser "conflict model of society." The exact synthesis of
these two state roles - educator and dictator - vary from national setting to national
setting, and from one time period to another. But the existence of these two roles is
essential to understanding the primary apparatuses of state rule.
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3. The State: Hegemonic Apparatuses
Gramsci's view of the State as both educator and dictator, leads to the
question: "What did Gramsci mean by the State?" In his final work, Prison Notebooks,
we find some answers.
We are still on the terrain, of the identification of State and government - an
identification which is preciselv a representation ... of the confusion between
civil society and political society. For it should be remarked that the General
notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of
civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil
society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion).
[Ref. 6:p. 263]
Political society and civil society are the two levels of societal superstructure. The
victorious elements of political society make up the political regime. The political
regime controls government, which stands at the apex of the State structure, and uses
this institutional bridge between society and the State to effect the regime's rule. 7 Thus,
the State is the institutional reflection of three elements: a political regime, the two
levels of superstructure (political society and civil society) and the infrastructure or
base (an economic base called "the mode of production"). Civil society is "the
ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'." [Ref. 6:p. 12] Joseph Femia, in his
review article on "Gramsci's Patrimony," lists the key aspects of civil society as political
parties, schools and universities, the mass media, trade unions, churches, etc. These
are the private organisms or structures of civil society which shape the social and
political consciousness of the masses. The ruling group both controls these
Gramsci's major work suffers from its lack of completeness. Within, the Prison
Notebooks Perry Anderson has identified three definitions of the State and its place, in
hegemonv. In the first definition there is opposition between the State, and civil
society. In the second definition, the State incfudcs or encompasses civil society. And
in the third view, the State and civil society are considered identical. (Ref. 8]
Additionally, Joseph Femia has identified both a narrow definition of the State as
synonymous with political societv and a broader definition "comprehending all
institutions which, whether formally public or private, enable the dominant social
group to rule." [Ref. 5:p. 348] This author, like Martin Carnoy, accepts a broader view
of the State as encompassing all of the societal superstructure, i.e., both political and
civil society. As such, hegemony represents a svnthesis - "this hegemony is everywhere,
but in diOerent forms" - as either political hegemony or civil hegemony. [Ref. 3:p. 73]
(For a contrary opinion see Femia [Ref. 9:p. 482].) While Gramsci does not expressly
distinguish between the State, the government, the political regime, and the political
society, this distinction is useful for analytic purposes. Since the State does encompass
all institutions which enable the dominant social group to rule, the author's distinction
is compatible but not identical with Gramsci's theory. For Gramsci, government was
the State. For the author, government is only the apex of the State.. This distinction
can be quite useful when analyzing which faction of the dominant social group actually
possesses the political power to make hegemonic decisions for society - i.e., which
faction controls the political regime and through it government and the State.
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apparatuses of transmission of ideas and values and uses them to establish its
hegemony. 8 In contrast, political society consists of all the structures commonly called
public institutions. Femia lists these public institutions as the courts, the police,
parliament, the army, the bureaucracy, the government, etc. These structures allow the
ruling group to exercise direct dominance over the masses. Both structures are
ultimately controlled by the ruling group and both affect the hegemonic control for the
ruling group.9 The public institutions manifest the overt coercive forces of the ruling
group. The public institutions serve as the armor of coercion protecting the private
structures of civil society. The ruling class has less overt control over the more
autonomous private structures which transmit the ruling culture throughout civil
society. Yet, because they dominate the various institutions and can monopolize the
ideas transmitted by the institutions, the ruling class can continue to shape the
consciousness of the masses. Only in those private structures which are largely outside
their control (such as the family unit), as well as those institutions (or individuals)
which oppose their hegemonic values and have not been silenced via coercion (such as
dissident institutions) is a constant struggle for consciousness being waged. Yet,
regardless of the structure or institution - the obvious, coercive-backed public
institutions in political society or the more subtle, private institutions in civil society -
the struggle for ideas is weighted largely in favor of the ruling group. 10 [Ref. 5:p. 348]
In commenting on this weighted struggle, an obvious question arises concerning
hegemony and the State.
If, as Gramsci says, the bourgeoisie [i.e., dominant class or group] can generally
count on the "spontaneous consent" of the masses, it gains political legitimacy by
weaving its own cultural outlook into the social fabric, then how can forms of
oppositional, alternative thought (such as Marxism [or anv other revolutionary
or dissident thought]) ever manage to flourish? [Ref. 5:p. 34S]
o
Civil superstructures are "civil" due to their private ownership by civil society,
rather than their function as "transmission belts." Civil superstructures/as opposed to
political superstructures, are outside direct, overt State control. Hence function is less
the determining factor than ownership.
This emphasis for ruling group control applies easily to authoritarian States.
However, it is less appropriate or inappropriate for pluralistic democratic States like
the United States.
The ruling group controls both the hegemonic structures and institutions which
serve to promote consensus, as well as the coercive structures and institutions which
prevent opposition and dissent.
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The answer to that question lies in Gramsci's view of counterhegemony and social
revolutions.
C. COUNTERHEGEMONY AND REVOLUTION
1. Counterhegemony: A Mechanism for Revolution.
• Counterhegemony is a mechanism for revolution. Gramsci interpreted the
unnaturally long life of capitalism in the West not to the technological efficiency of a
mass capitalist society - the economic base of society. Rather he attributed
capitalism's longevity to the normative order propagated by the ideological
superstructures of the State. A inherently unstable state, for Gramsci, can only survive
"because the organs of civil society hide the regime's structural inadequacies behind a
thick ideological veil." [Ref. 9:p. 476] Gramsci felt the only way to defeat such a state
was to counter the hegemony of the dominant ruling group. Hence, he advocated the
establishment of a nucleus of counterhegemonic culture and social relations, completely
contrary to the culture and social relations of the dominant group. The
counterhegemony should occur prior to any attempt to overthrow the existing state.
One analyst describes a "Gramscian revolution" this way,
at the heart of [Gramsci's] political thinking lies a paradox: a revolution must
occur before the revolution; i.e., a fundamental transformation of the spirit and
practice of present-day societv is a precondition of proletarian revolution [or of
social revolution in general]. [Ref. 9:p. 477],
Thus Gramsci, by emphasizing the role of a counterhegemonic revolution prior to an
actual revolt, has fixed the "battle for the mind" as the first stage of a social revolution.
The second stage of a social revolution would be the "battle for state power." One
could even equate a hegemonic-counterhegemonic "battle for the mind" as a Gramscian
form of a revolution-from- below. 11 This "battle for the mind" or counterhegemony is a
required mechanism for revolt-especially in Western states.
A revolution-from-below is also called a bottom-up revolution, a mass
revolution and even an Asian model of revolution.
.
In a revolution-from-below, the
mobilization of the masses in civil society is required to occur either prior to or
simultaneous with the paramilitary assault on the State itself. For Gramsci, the timing
is far more precise - the mobilization of the consciousness of the masses must first take
place (i.e., win the "battle for the mind" using counterhegemony), and then the direct
attack on the State can begin. Thus a Leninist type of revolution, a largely top-down
revolution, is contrary to "Gramsci's strategy. Alter all, if a Leninist revolutionary
party wins control over the State, it still must win the "battle for the mind" before its
social vision can proceed by consensual means rather than coercive means.
12Gramsci distinguished between modern states and backward countries. In
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The "battle for the mind" pits hegemonic forces against counterhegemonic
forces competing for the control of man's thoughts (or consciousness). In a successful
hegemony, the dominant group tries to actively attract all other groups - the whole of
society - in order to expand its state power. "Successful" hegemony frees the coercive
apparatuses of constraint, lessens the need for punitive violence and prevents the State
from the continued need to impose its ideology [Ref. 10:p. 81]. One can even speak, of
"integral" hegemony where the masses are so integrated into the dominant culture that
their affiliation approaches unqualified support. Integral hegemony can continue to
exist, as long as the ruling group performs a progressive function causing the whole
society to move forward. [Ref. 5:p. 348] These two - successful and integral -
hegemonies represent hegemonic situations of strong intensity.
Gramsci recognized that hegemonic situations vary in intensity. In some
cases, the hegemonic structure of society shows signs of decay. The mass consent of
subordinate groups to the dominant group is only superficial. A person's conscious
thoughts and the unconscious values evident by his actions are frequently incompatible
and at odds. Gramsci calls this kind of contradiction between thoughts (i.e., explicit
consciousness) and action (i.e., implicit consciousness) an expression of a
"contradictory consciousness."
This contrast between thought and action, i.e., the co-existence of tvvo
conceptions , of the world, one affirmed in words and the other displaved in
effective action . . . cannot but be the expression of profounder contrasts of a
social. historical order.. It signifies that the social group in question may indeed
have its own conception of the world, even if onlv embryonic; a conception
which manifests itself in action, but occasionally in 'flashes - when, that is. the
group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of
backward countries, like Russia in 1917,
the State was everything,, civil society was primordial and gelatinous: in the West,
there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State
trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. [Ref. 6:p. 238]
Thus
.
backward states, . for Gramsci, lack developed mechanisms of cultural
organization, and the social order is founded on ignorance and repression. The masses
are not integrated into the political regime's value system. In a backward state, where
stability is not based on voluntary consent, when the State is attacked only a weak
superstructure o( civil society exists to keep social order. In a backward state "where no
real hegemony exists, a top-down revolution can occur and no counterhegemonic
struggle is needed to affect a social transformation. While Gramsci's point is largely
correct,, some backward third world states have an highly developed hesemonv.
Afghanistan is an example of such a backward country, and the Mujahidee'n
counterrevolution is an example of how strong Afghanistan's pre- 1978 hegemony was.
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submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its
own but is borrowed from another group .... The active man-in-the-mass has a
practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical
activity .... One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses
(or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity . . .
and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and
uncritically absorbed. [Kef. 6:pp. 327, 333]
Thus, on the abstract plane the common man endorses the prevailing Weltanschauung
or dominant ideology. But on a practical plane, he does not reveal open dissent and
opposition. Rather, his discontent erupts occasionally and takes the form of protests,
demonstrations, riots, crime, strikes. At the practical level, a contradictory
consciousness reflects both a reduction in individual commitment to the dominant
ideology as well as the incipient existence of a "revolutionary mentality."
A contradictory consciousness arises in a "decadent" hegemony which
possesses an ambivalent and inconsistent mass consciousness. A decadent hegemony is
powerful enough to ensure "passivity and submission", but none the less
vulnerable, out of harmony with the true needs and inclinations of the people.
Conflict lurks just beneath the calm surface of social life. [Ref. 5:p. 349]
In order for this out-of-touch hegemonic state to be revolutionarily transformed, a
"crisis of hegemony" must occur.
2. Gramsci's Revolution
a. A Crisis of Hegemony
The first stage of a Gramscian revolution - winning the "battle for the
mind" via counterhegemony - should provoke a crisis of hegemony. A crisis of
hegemony arises when the dominant group (through the State) is placed in a position
where it can on longer exert consensual rule. The dominant group's authority to rule
is severely challenged and the State itself is facing a serious general crisis. The
traditional means of maintaining dominant-class hegemony is no longer effective.
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e.,. is no longer "leading" but only
"dominant," exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great
masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer
believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists that the old
is dying and the new cannot be born. [Ref. 6:pp. 25-26]
This crisis can arise out of unpopular actions by the ruling group (through the State),
domestic or economic crises handled poorly by the ruling group resulting in serious
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consequences, poor handling of governmental reforms, widespread unbelief in the
ideology of the State, hardships which become so intolerable that no force is capable of
mitigating it and re-establishing social order legally. Ultimately a crisis of hegemony
reflects both a crisis of the State and a crisis in the belief system of the ruling group. A
crisis of hegemony indicates the disintegration of the apparatuses and capabilities of
the State to maintain and further the dominant group's hegemony, and maintain the
dominant group's capability to rule indirectly through the ideological superstructures of
the State. [Ref. 3:pp. 78-79] At times of a potential crisis of hegemony, the State can
attempt to resecure its position via a passive revolution or governmental reform.
b. A Passive Revolution.
The term "passive revolution" was used by Gramsci to indicate a
"'revolution' without a 'revolution.'" [Ref. 6:p. 59] A passive revolution, according to
Martin Carnoy, involves
the constant reorganization of State power and its relationship to the dominated
classes to preserve dominant-class hegemony and to exclude the masses from
exerting inlluence over political and economic institutions .... Faced by
potential active masses, then, the State institutes passive revolution as a
technique that the bourgeoisie [i.e., dominant class or croup] attempts to adapt
when its hegemony is weakened in any way. [Ref. 3:p. 76]
Hegemony can be threatened in several ways. First, it can be threatened during times
of erupting discontent, as a result of a widespread contradictory consciousness on the
practical plane. This is especially the case in decadent hegemonic situations where the
State is trying to maintain passivity and submission of the population. Second,
hegemony can be threatened by an expanding counterhegemonic movement which
represents an ideological or cultural position which is alternate to and exclusive of the
hegemonic ideology or culture. Third, a crisis of hegemony can result from either a
poorly effected previous reform or the need for current reform. During times of a crisis
of hegemony, the State may choose to have a passive revolution. Fourth, whenever
the political superstructure (i.e., the State's combined coercive apparatus and
hegemonic apparatus) cannot cope with the fundamental demands of subordinate
groups, regardless of whether these demands are counterhegemonic or not, hegemony
is threatened. The key here is whether the demand is fundamental to the group and
beyond the coercive power of the State. One of the goals of a passive revolution is to
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encourage subordinate groups to restrict their struggle against the State and accept the
legitimacy of dominant group rule of the State in return for the acceptance of certain
demands from below. Therefore, the revolution is passive because it consists in
"preventing the development of a revolutionary adversary by 'decapitating' its
revolutionary potential." [Ref. ll:p. 133] This allows the ruling group to survive
despite challenges to its rule. In fact, one of the problems facing a revolutionary is
how to challenge the State's hegemony without provoking a passive revolution. After
all, a revolutionary seeks a complete social transformation, not just limited acceptance
of certain demands or partial reforms. This is why a "revolution without a revolution"
can be disastrous for those who seek the complete restructuring of the State's
superstructure or infrastructure (base).
Each passive revolution can be evaluated from two vantage points: did it
involve an acceptance of demands from below and did it undercut the revolutionary
potential of subordinate groups. Just because a subordinate group gets the
government to accept certain demands, does not imply a passive revolution. It just
means the government, by accepting a passive revolution has starved-off an active
revolution. This explains one reason why most dissident movements fail to become
revolutionary. Most dissident movements are satisfied with only changing a specific
policy or mode of rule. They do not seek to fundamentally displace either the
hegemonic rule of the dominant group or its hegemonic apparatuses (i.e., the political
and civil superstructure of the State). Thus, these movements normally have little
revolutionary potential and are satisfied with relatively limited reforms. As a result,
most dissident movements never provoke a real passive revolution and never threaten
the hegemony of the ruling group. Additionally, not all governmental reforms
undercut revolutionary potential. At times, governmental policies change, not as a
result of demands from below but as a result of policy choices from on top. Sometimes
these reforms in fact encourage revolutionary potential. This type of reform is not a
passive revolution and can provoke a future crisis of hegemony. Lastly, at times the
ruling group attempts an unsuccessful passive revolution - accepting demands from
below but not undercutting the revolutionary potential. At times like this, with its
hegemony already threatened, a crisis of hegemony will develop. From this discussion,
one of the key threats to a developing counterhegemony can be a successful passive
revolution. Thus in those States who hegemonic rule can accommodate change, the
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ruling group is normally effective at passive revolution and maintaining its ruling
position. But in States whose hegemonic rule is both inflexible and unchanging, most
passive revolutions prove unsuccessful and do not remove revolutionary potential
c. An Alternative Revolutionary Strategy
Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, counterhegemony, crisis of hegemony
and passive revolution stem directly from one of his fundamental premises - the
superstructure of the State plays the primary role in the ruling group's ability to
dominate the consciousness of subordinate groups. From this premise, Gramsci
developed an alternative revolutionary strategy called the "war of position." This
strategy was an alternate to what he called the. "war of maneuver" or the frontal attack
on the State by paramilitary forces. Gramsci sought to explain his strategy in the
military terms of the First World War:
The [Western] State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a
powerful svstem of fortresses and earthen works [i.e., civil societv] more or less
numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying - but this precisely
necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country .... [In
reality,] the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern
warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed
to have destroyed the enemy's entire delensive system, whereas in fact it only
destroyed the outer perimeter: and at the moment of their advance and attack the
assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defense which was still
effective. The same thing happens in politics. jRef. 6:pp. 238,235]
For Gramsci, the political objective of a social revolution was not capturing the State
which was only the outer perimeter of the ruling class' system. Instead, he sought to
capture the ideological superstructures of civil society and use them to establish an
alternative hegemony. Thus, in the West, he concluded that a lightning frontal attack
( i.e., a war of maneuver) on the state apparatus was insufficient because of the
secondary line of cultural defense. What was needed was a protracted siege on the
hegemonic apparatuses. He advocated that revolutionary forces gradually subvert the
ideological organs of hegemony, and erode the entire ideology and culture (i.e.,
attitudes, prohibitions, myths, values and perspective) of the dominant group. This
would leave the ruled free and independent of their rulers. This cultural transformation
1 o
This can be seen as a difference between pluralist democracies and autocratic
dictatorships. In the former, it is easier to decapitate revolutionary potential without
hurting hegemonic rule. In the latter, hegemonic rule must rely heavily on coercion in
order to decapitate revolutionarv situations.
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- destroying one hegemony and creating another - was both a necessary phase and an
essential precondition for a successful social revolution.
Gramsci's war of position involved the counterhegemony of the
subordinate groups as surrounding the State hegemonic apparatus. Counterhegemony
was both a mass organization or movement of the subordinate group and a developing
apparatus for subordinate group institutions, ideology and culture. "A social group
can, and indeed must, already exercise leadership (i.e., be hegemonic) before winning
governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of
such power)." [Ref. 6:p. 207] After the "war of position" has been won, a war of
maneuver can take place, launching an attack on the State apparatus while Gramsci
never questioned the role of the armed struggle or its decisive role in achieving ultimate
victory. He also did not over-emphasize its importance. The battle for
counterhegemony was key to any successful social revolution and the battle of primary
importance. 14
3. The Role of Intellectuals
In order to effectively battle the State for the minds of the masses, Gramsci
regarded the role of intellectuals as significant. Intellectuals are actively involved in the
battle for the mind of the masses, i.e., hegemony. Gramsci defined two types of
intellectuals: traditional and organic. Traditional intellectuals are all those
traditionally regarded as intellectuals (e.g., artists, scientists, scholars, etc.) and the
intellectual remains of previous social formations (e.g., ecclesiastics). Traditional
intellectuals tend to function autonomously and are not organically linked to their class
or group of origin. Nevertheless, the dominant group can use these intellectuals as
part of their hegemonic apparatus, co-opting them to maintain dominant group rule.
Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, are directly related or organic to their
particular class or group and function to build the hegemony of that class or group. 15
The dominant group, besides its own organic intellectuals can also "reach into the
subordinate classes [or groups] for additional intellectuals to give homogeneity and
I4For a more detailed discussion on the wars of position and maneuver see
Michael Carnoy's chapter on Gramsci [Ref. 3:pp. 80-85].
While Gramsci characterized intellectuals in class-oriented terms, I feel his
terms can be extrapolated to nonclass groups. Thus an organic intellectual represents
the hegemonic interests of the dominant social division within a particular society, to
which he belongs. It is just as accurate to say an organic intellectual of the proletarian
class represents proletarian hegemony in a bourgeoisie society, as to say a subordinate
ethnic group intellectual represents his ethnic group's hegemony in a multiethnic
society (e.g., the Soviet Union).
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self-awareness to the dominant group." [Ref. 3:p. 85] These organic intellectuals,
despite their subordinate group origins, act like dominant group intellectuals. Gramsci
also broadened the "organic intellectual" category to include any person who possesses
a particular technical or managerial skill. They are the thinking and organizing
elements of every class or group. These intellectuals are organic but are distinguished
less by profession than by function; they direct and manage the ideas and aspirations
of the class or group to which they organically belong. [Refs. 3,5,6:pp. 85-86,355,3]
Both groups of intellectuals - traditional and organic - fulfill an intellectual function for
civil society, whether for the ruling group or the subordinate group. As a result, they
can provide both leadership for the politically active elements of society, as well as
motivation for the politically passive elements.
Intellectuals can play one of two roles in society. Some intellectuals serve as
"the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony
and political government," while others serve as part of the revolutionary process.
[Ref. 6:p. 12] The dominant group, through its political party or parties, attempts to
join the traditional intellectuals (from both the dominant and the subordinate groups)
with the organic intellectuals of the dominant group. This merger allows the political
party or parties of the dominant group to exercise its hegemony. A revolutionary
party attempts to achieve a similar goal. It attempts to join together disaffected
dominant group intellectuals (both traditional and organic), traditional intellectuals
from their subordinate group, and organic intellectuals from the subordinate group -
the thinker-organizers of the subordinate group "with a conscious conception of the
world that transcends their class interests." [Ref. 3:p. 87] These organic (subordinate
group) intellectuals
provided the basis for Gramsci's political strategy [i.e., counterhegemony and a
war of position] - the establishment of the proletariat's [or subordinate group's]
cultural and moral superiority, independent of its direct political power.
[Ref. 3:p. 87]
From this discussion of intellectuals, one can conclude that in a war of position the
countcrhegemonic army is led by the intellectuals - both traditional and subordinate
group organic intellectuals - and its ranks are filled with the organic mass of individuals
who no longer adhere to the hegemonic consciousness of the ruling group. This is the
army which forms a counterhegemony against the ruling group and forms a
revolutionary political party against the State.
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In the Soviet Union, the Central Asian Muslim masses are challenging and
rejecting the socialist consciousness of the Russian ruling group. These masses, led by
traditional intellectuals - Muslim scholars - and organic intellectuals - the unofTical
Mullahs of Islamic Sufi orders - are forming a developing counterhegemony against the
Russians, the Communist Party, and the Soviet state. A clearer understanding of the
hegemony of the Russian nation and especially the Russian Communists in the Soviet
Union is the first step in fully comprehending the significance of the Central Asian
challenge.
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III. RUSSIAN HEGEMONY AND THE SOVIET STATE
Gramsci's theory of hegemony revolves around the cultural and ideological
dominance of a ruling social division over a subordinate social division. The key is to
identify whether these divisions are horizontal classes or vertical nationalities. In the
Soviet Union these divisions are nationalities. The dominant national group, the Great
Russians or just Russians, extend a hegemonic rule over the entire Soviet state. The
Russians have extended their rule over subordinate nationalities and exert a cultural
hegemony over them. In this chapter, two aspects of Gramsci's theory are outlined -
dominant social divisions, and Russian hegemony. Gramsci's analysis of the State, his
theory of hegemony and his strategy of a revolutionary war of position all point
towards one fundamental purpose -- his desire to achieve a successful social revolution
against a state. Therefore, it is important to place any revolutionary challenge to a
state within the larger context of Gramsci's state theory7 .
A. DOMINANT SOCIAL DIVISION: NATIONAL GROUPS
The Soviet Union is not a nation-state. Rather, it is a "State of nations." Hclene
Carrere d'Encausse makes this point clearly in her book Decline of an Empire. The
Soviet Union "is not a nation so much as an empire, in a world where empires are
fading away. In short, it is not the 'state of workers and peasants' it claims to be. The
truth is that it is primarily a State of nations." [Ref. 12:p. 11] Therefore, the dominant
social division in the Soviet Union is not the horizontal stratification of society into
classes, but the vertical stratification of society into national groups. Yet, this
stratification runs contrary to Lenin's original conception of civil society.
Lenin, like Marx, saw social stratification of any kind as an abomination. For
Lenin the horizontal stratification of society into classes was determined by the
particular economic base (or mode of production) of society. In the socialist mode of
production, the proletariat together with its class ally, the peasants, would eradicate
civil society of any bourgeoisie elements. Thus civil society, dominated by the
collective ownership of production, would function under the leadership of the
proletariat but be essentially free of horizontal class cleavages or competition. In the
Soviet Union today, civil society appears largely absent of strong horizontally based
cleavages. While some would argue that the intelligentsia is really a social class, rather
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than just the "upper stratum" of the proletariat and peasant classes or that the
Communist Party (CPSU) represents a new privileged ruling class, 16 these cleavages do
not appear to be the dominant social cleavages. Rather, they reflect interests of
national groups rather than collectively forming an independent class.
The stratification of Soviet civil society into vertical divisions is also contrary to
Lenin's original conception. Lenin was an internationalist. He believed that
nationalism was a social superstructure of capitalist society. Nationalism was,
therefore, an outgrowth of private property and served to divide the class-based
loyalties of the proletariat. He believed class-based international loyalties would win
out over nationality-based loyalties. Yet during the Russian Civil War and its
aftermath, the Bolsheviks had to reform their internationalist vision in order to prevent
the dissolution of the former Russian empire, which they sought to control. The 1924
USSR constitution formalized the acceptance of national groups and the vertical
stratification of society. The 1924 Constitution called for a federal institutional
structure and the promotion of national cultures. As Helene Carrere d'Encausse notes
National culture was therefore a double-barrelled concept, one that was perfectlv
defined by Stalin. These cultures were to be national in form - principally as to
language. But at the same time they were to be socialist in content. What these
national languages were to transmit was not each nation's own heritase, but a
new heritage shared by all -- socialism, its values and ultimate goals. [Ref. 12:p.
26]
The goal of this political formula for national cultures was the eventual formation of a
single Socialist community free from vertical cleavages within civil society.
The current results of Soviet nationality policies have failed to "merge" or "fuse"
the various national groups in the Soviet Union. In some cases, even "rapprochement"
has been tenuous at best. Despite the declaration of a historic new community — the
"Soviet people" — by the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution, federalism remained the law of
For a contrary position, see Paul M. Sweezy's article, "Is There a Ruling Class
in the USSR?" and Charles Bettelheim's book Class Struggles in the USSR
[Refs. 13,14]. While I agree that the CPSU, especially the Central Committee, has at
all times contained the upper strata of Soviet civil society, and forms the basis of the
Soviet power elite, I disagree that it supports a case for class-based analysis of the





society according to nationality rather than class. The Central Committee is an
instrument of the political elites of the Russian nationalitv "roup rather than a
separate class. See also Yaroslav Bilinsky's article, "The Rulers and the Ruled"
[Ref. 16].
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the land -- an expression of national differences. Some scholars see this declaration of
a "Soviet people" as more of a normative goal rather than a concrete empirical reality.
One scholar asserts that "we are witnessing the reversal of an old Stalinist slogan: the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is increasingly becoming socialist in form, but
national in content." [Ref. 17:p. 76] Thus, the Soviet Union instead of developing a
stronger socialist culture has in reality strengthened the various national cultures of
civil society. In light of this discussion, nationality and national identity continue to
exert a tremendous force on Soviet civil society. Therefore, the dominant social
division of control and cleavage remains national groups. 17
After describing the Soviet Union as primarily a "State of nations" rather than a
nation-state or a "State of classes," a compelling question still exists - "What is a
nation?" The term "nation" denotes "a body of people, associated with a particular
territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government
peculiarly its own." [Ref. 22:p. 886] In the Soviet case, each nation does not "possess a
government peculiarly its own." Only those nations officially recognized are
represented directly by national governments. Yet the power of these national
governments is limited by the federal system (especially the federal system of the 1977
Brezhnev Constitution) and ultimately by the Communist Party. According to Stalin,
in his book Marxism and the National Question, "a nation is an historically evolved,
stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory,
economic life, and psychological makeup [or national character] manifested in a
common culture." [Ref. 23:p. 16] Stalin required all four characteristics to be present;
otherwise, a nation ceases to be a nation. This definition, as applied by the Soviets, is
also inadequate. In the Soviet Union these characteristics are prescribed by the State.
One characteristic, territory, has been denied to at least three "nations" (i.e., the Soviet
For a more thorough discussion of the major arguments concerning Soviet
nationality policy, and federalism see the following works done bv Helene Carrere
d'Encausse, Grey Hodnett, Roman Sporluk arid Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone
[Refs. 12,13,19,2021]
i O
The USSR contains 53 territorial units with a native governmental structure:
15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous provisions or oblasts, and
10 national regions or okrugs. Nevertheless, at least three national groups, each
numbering over one million people, have not been represented bv territorial units --
Germans, Jews and Poles. This lack of official recognition does not negate that these
groups are nations.
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German, Jewish, and Polish national groups) in order to weaken their national identity.
Both of these definitions are inappropriate for our study because they involve
attributes that are State controlled as opposed to "people" controlled.
In the Soviet Union, the most important characteristic of a nation is that people
feel they are a nation. Seton-Watson also agrees that the center-of-gravity for a
defining an nation should lie with the people. He concludes that
A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider
themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary
that. the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not
possible to lay down docmaticallv a minimum percentage of a population which
must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses
"national consciousness." [Ref. 24:p. 5]
Therefore, it is less important that the Soviet state attribute "national consciousness" to
a group of people than that the group of people perceive themselves as a nation. The
perception of a "national consciousness" can produce a "we-they" dichotomy.
The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of
people who feel that they are a nation .... To advance beyond it, it is necessarv
to attempt to take the nation apart and to isolate for separate examination the
forces and elements which appear to have been the most influential in bringing
about the sense of common identity which lies at .its roots,, the. sense oPthe
existence of a singularly important national "we" which, is distinguished from, all
others who make up an alien "they." This is necessarily an overly mechanical
process, for nationalism, like other 'profound emotions such as love and hate, is
more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational
analysis. [Ref. 25:p. 102]
This definition of a nation, made by Rupert Emerson in his book From Empire to
Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, is extremely critical to
analyzing national hegemony in the Soviet case. Any empire which functions as a
"State of nations" is susceptible to national self-assertions - whether for autonomy
within the empire or separation from the empire. A subset of the people of the
empire's civil society can form a national consciousness of "we" which opposes a
national consciousness of "they." The "we" reject the "they" and distinguish themselves
from them. These national consciousnesses do not have to equate simply to ethnic
identity and can vary depending on who asks the question "what nationality are you?"
The first is called "orthodox" nationalism and "involves the pursuit of political,
economic, and cultural autonomy within the system." The second is called
"unorthodox" nationalism and is "characterized by advocacy of succession and
independence and/or rejection of the system's ideological mold." {Ref. 21:p. 4]
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Thus in Central Asia, two Central Asians of different ethnic backgrounds (e.g., one
Uzbek and the other Tajik) will probably identify themselves according to their ethnic
identities. But when a Russian enters the group, the "we-they" dichotomy becomes
transethnic; a Central Asian Muslim national consciousness forms. Now the answer to
the question would be "We are Soviet Muslims." In the Soviet Union, it is the Central
Asian Muslim national consciousness which forms a counterhegemonic "we" that
challenges the hegemony of the Russian "they." But the Russian "they" is the
dominant national group and currency is able to rule the Soviet state through its
cultural and ideological ascendancy, and through the Communist Party.
B. RUSSIAN HEGEMONY
The Russian nationality dominates the Soviet "State of Nations" and the
contrived "Soviet nationalism" which the state tries to foster. The presence of this
Russian predominance has been discussed at length by Western scholars, especially in
relation to other nationality issues. Nevertheless, this dominance has not been
positioned within a larger conception of the Soviet state or state theory. Gramsci's
theory of hegemony provides a useful analytic vehicle for that discussion.
1. A Mechanism for Rule
The Soviet Union is a multifaceted actor in the international milieu. Yet, at
the center of the Soviet state beats a Russian heart. In fact, the "Russianness" of the
Soviet Union shapes the two most important institutional identities of the Soviet
Union - the Russian national identity and the Communist Party identity. Each of
these institutional identities is an outgrowth of the Russian ideological and cultural
hegemony of the Soviet state. [Ref. 26:p. 17]
a. The Russian Nation Identity
The Soviet Union is the successor to the former Russian Imperial
Empire. This empire did not collapse and die during the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
Rather, it transmutated into the Soviet Union. This point is fundamental to
understanding why the Russians are the ruling nationality group in the Soviet Union.
The Great Russian nation was the backbone of Czarist Russia. It extended
its colonial control primarily by force - military conquest - over a host of weaker
nationality groups. As part of its colonial policy, the Russian culture and values were
While the Soviet State is technically the direct descendant of the Kercnsky
Republic of 1917, it is still correct to consider the Soviet State as the successor of the
Russian Czarist State.
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used to transform minority nationality culture and values. This process - Russification
- permitted the Russians to culturally co-opt local masses into accepting Russian rule.
Additionally, Russification also allowed co-opted local elites to manage Russian rule in
these border areas. Russification is an example of Russian hegemony which sought to
assert "Russianness" and assimilate all other minorities. Effective russification
permitted the Czar to rule his colonies by "colonial consensus" among the nations who
"bought into" the Russian social vision. This colonial consensus allowed the Russian
military to revert to a more covert position. But in those colonial areas who rejected
Russian assimilation or who sought to assert their contrary national identity, the
Russian military actively sought to effect its rule through force and coercion.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet state emerged. But this
new state was a transformed version of the old empire. The Soviet Union that emerged
was almost identical demographically and territorially to the Russian Empire. The
Bolsheviks, through the Civil War struggle, had developed a vested interest in keeping
the Russian Empire territorially intact. Rule was asserted through military force and
coercion. During these initial years, force and coercion were instrumental for ensuring
the continued existence of the transmuted Russian Empire.
The new Soviet Union also reflected the continued presence of Russian -
Imperial Empire culture. In the Czarist Empire, the Russian culture formed the
dominant culture of the land - all other cultures were forced into submission to the
Great Russian culture. The Russian culture was the ruling culture; the Russian ideas
were the ruling ideas. But the new Soviet Union was more than just the reflection of
this Russian predominance.
As the historical and juridical successor to the Russian state, the Soviet Union
also functions as the custodian and heir to the interests of the Russian nation, an
imperial and traditionallv ruling nation. And in this capacity fulfills the role of
preserving and extending the values, goals, and interests of historic Russia.
[Ref. 26:p 16]
As a result, the Soviet Union represents its dominant demographic constituency - the
Russian people. This representation is seen in the melding of things Russian with
things called "Soviet." But, Russian hegemony is more than just the use of Russian
culture fo r Soviet culture. It also includes an ideological dimension.
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b. The Communist Party Identity
The Soviet Union is an ideological state. For Lenin, the Communist Party
represented an ideological vanguard of revolutionary proletariat. In Czarist Russia,
proletariat were scarce in number. The Russian nation contained the greatest quantity
of proletariat and was essential for articulating proletariat interests in the backward
non-Russian areas. In Central Asia especially, the Russian-run Tashkent Soviet
exerted its "ideological" will over the Muslim nationalists' Kokand government. While
the "colonial mentality" of this Soviet was later condemned by the more metropolitan
Moscow communists, the damage had been done. Muslim nationalists, alienated by
this chauvinism formed the backbone of the Basmachi Revolt of Central Asia. 21 This
Central Asian example shows how a dominant nationality's nationalism, armed with an
universalistic ideology like Marxism- Leninism, could use it to justify its nationalistic
dominance.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union provided Russians a vehicle for
ideological hegemony. Lenin desired the Party to remain above all nationalities. In
particular, he wanted to prevent the assertion of Russian nationalism into the Party.
But, as Roman Szporluk points out, Lenin never "devised an effective method of
curbing Russian nationalism." [Ref. 20:p. 26] The early Communist Party was
predominantly Russian. In 1926, 75 percent of the Communist Party membership was
Great Russian, and those who were not Russian by origin were Russified
[Refs. 20,26:pp. 25,20]. The Bolsheviks' first converts and their main strength rested
with the urban-oriented Russian people, especially Russian proletariat.
This initial trend of a nationalist-oriented Communist Party has not died
out over the years. According to Mark G. Field, the Russians themselves pioneered
"national communism." National communism
may be described as the search, on the part of a nation that has recently emerged
as a major world power on the world scene, for a national and cultural identitv
and rests on the fusion of the doctrinal bases of the Communist movement and
identification of the interests of that movement (which is, in essence,
supra-national) with the interests of the Russian nation. This fusion was born
primarily out of the recognition, on the part of the Soviet leadership by the end
of the twenties that .no proletariat revolution . . . was in sight . . . and the
resulting decision (primarily Stalin's) to build "socialism in one countrv." From
that point on, according to Stalin, Russia was to be considered as the Bastion of
the Communist movement and, as a corollary, anything that added to the
.
For more on the inital development of communism in Central Asia see the
following: Michael Rvwkin's book, Ilelene Carrere d'Encausse's chapters in Edward
Allworth's book, and David Klein's State Department paper. [Refs. 27,28,29]
33
strength of Russia as a nation (industrialization, for example) was good for the
movement. [Ref. 30:p. 196]
In light of Russian national communism, which together with Stalin led to the purging
of non- Russian national communists from the Communist Party in the 1930s,22 how
would one characterize the Russian revolution and the development of a hegemonic
ideology in neo-Gramscian terms?
2. The Russian Revolution and Hegemony
The Russian revolution drastically transformed Russian social and political
structures. However, the revolution failed to alter the cultural and political dominance
of the State by Russians. As a result, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the
revolution did not remove or eradicate the pre-existing Russian hegemony. Instead,
the revolution ushered in a new ideological foundation which enabled Russian
hegemony to continue after the revolution.
a. The Hegemonic Role of The Russian Revolution
The Russian revolution radically altered the ideological basis for Russian
dominance without radically altering its cultural basis. Hence, the Bolshevik Party and
the Communist Party reflect this changed ideology, unchanged culture as national
communism. National communism then is a form of hegemony - Russian hegemony -
in many ways no different than the Czarist forms. Thus, the dominant social group in
the Soviet Union is the same as was in pre-revolutionary Russia and only the ruling
faction of that group has changed. The Bolshevik Revolution represents the transfer
of State power from one Russian ruling group - the Russian bourgeoisie - to another
Russian ruling group - the Russian proletariat (or those who represent the Russian
proletariat). To paraphrase Stalin's formula, communism in the Soviet Union is
primarily Russian nationalism in form and Socialist in content. But, even its content -
socialism - was interpreted through "Russian eyes." One could go so far as to conclude
22 For an excellent source on Muslim national communists, who were originally
co-opted into the Party and later purged for their deviationism see [Ref. 31].
23While the composition of this ruling faction has changed, over time, the
dominant social group remains Russian. Under the Czars, Russian royalty and
bourgeoisie ruled the empire. The Bolsheviks replaced that Russian faction with the
CPSu. Today, the CPSU has changed from largely ideologues to a mix of ideologues
and technocrats.
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that Soviet communism was and is Russian nationalism in form and Russian socialism
in content. The Bolsheviks were able to change the content of the Czarist
Weltanschauung without changing its form. This has allowed
Russian imperial national interests ... [to be] "internationalized" and advanced in
the name of Communism, Russian values ... [to bel internalized as Marxist
canons and imposed upon the non-Russians, as Russian cultural norms
"universalized" as Soviet norms, have been adopted and assimilated by
non-Russian nationalities. All this has been done in the name of "progress'*'
rather than explicit russification and therefore has been done more effective and
permanent. [Kef. 26:p. 17]
Veron Aspaturian highlights how effective this socialist content has been in ensuring
continued national dominance. Even today, communist ideologies and historians have
been able to justify the need for Russian imperialist conquest of the borderlands
ideologically. Russian imperialism, formerly an "absolute evil" and then a "lesser evil,"
became an "absolute good." Only the socialist content of Marxism- Leninism, as
explained by the Party, could justify "the progressive character of tsarist conquest" as
an absolute good and a progressive event. The conquest of Russian colonies permitted
subordinate nationalities the privilege of coming under a "more advanced Russian
culture" and experiencing the "benevolent influence of the Russian people." Therefore,
the Russian revolution has allowed continued Russian dominance using a more
effective form of rule - socialism - without altering the mechanism - Russian hegemony.
b. The Consequences Of The Russian Revolution
The Russian Revolution has had two often overlooked consequences which
a "neo-Gramscian analytic-cut" more fully exposes. First, the Russian Revolution,
besides being a social revolution transforming the class structure of Russian civil
society and a "top-down" revolution executed by the Leninist vanguard party, was also
a passive revolution. Second, the Russian revolution established communism as the
theoretical basis for Russian hegemony.
A passive revolution, according to Gramsci, can occur during times of
erupting discontent and widespread contradictory consciousness on the practical plane.
This situation, referred to as a "decadent hegemony," characterized the Russian empire
during the end of the Czarist era and the brief "Kerensky interlude." The Czarist
content of ideological and cultural assimilation - russification - was unable to assimilate
the conquered territories. Additionally, the Czarist policies proved unable to prevent
alienation within its own nationality group. The Bolshevik revolution which pitted
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Russian worker against Russian bourgeoisie (i.e., Reds versus Whites) proved largely to
be a Russian top-down social revolution. Thus, Russia experienced a social
transformation of its horizontal layers which the Russian proletariats were able,
through Russian colonialists and military force, to extend throughout the empire. But
the Russian revolution was also a passive revolution of the vertical groupings of the
empire. This passive revolution involved the reorganization of state power (i.e.,
Russian state power) and its relationship to the subordinated national groups inorder
to preserve dominant national group hegemony and to exclude the masses from the
ruling political and economic institutions of the State [Ref. 3:p. 76]. Russian State
power was reorganized through the Bolshevik revolution. Socialist ideology proved
effective at co-opting national elites without allowing ideological dominance, autonomy
or independence. Federalism as it developed reflected this changed relationship.
Federalism insured the socialist content of this new relationship - relationships among
proletariat classes and their class allies only - while it also preserved a Russian form of
rule. The Communist Party ensured that this horizontal social revolution and changed
content did not weaken the national hegemony of the Russian nation. Lenin observed
that the Russian bureaucrat, who pervaded the Communist Party and managed the
federal system of government, was essentially a Great Russian chauvinist and not an
egalitarian internationalist. [Ref. 12:p. 23] In that light, it would be accurate to say,
"scratch a Bolshevik and you will find a Russian nationalist."24 While granted, the
Russian Communists were not necessarily actively trying to secure a passive revolution,
and some even sought to undermine Russian dominance by sacrificing the Russian
state for internationalist goals, the end empirical result of the Russian Revolution was
still a passive revolution. 25 The Russian passive revolution explains why "Russian
This statement is a rephrasing of Dostoevsky's characterization of the Russian
intelligentsia, written in 1877, "grattez le Russe et vous verrez le Tartare" (scratch a
Russian and you will find a Tartar). [Ref. 32:p. 72]
25Sultan Galiev and his Muslim national communism illustrates this point quite
well. Sultan Galiev introduced the concept of "proletarian nations" to Marxist theory.
Based on Marx's idea of the revenge of "the oppressed" against their "oppressors,"
Sultan Galiev postulated that the oppressed peoples are the colonialized peoples of all
classes rather than the proletariat class of Western industrial states. Thus the
colonized peoples are all proletarian, even if their industrial proletarian is small in size,
the nation is a proletarian nation. Additionally, he concluded that national, liberation
movements (i.e., the freeing of proletarian nations from their colonial positions) are
both progressive and Socialist. By placing primary importance on the national
emancipation struggle rather than the class-struggle, he also stressed that the socialist
allies of the colonized proletariat are vertically determined (i.e., the other classes within
that nation) rather than horizontal^/ determined (i.e., the proletariat classes of.other
nations, especially the proletariat of former imperial powers). In the Soviet Union.
these ideas were threatening to the Russian proletariat who Sultan Galiev felt were
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character," "Russian political culture" and "Russian strategic culture" are such useful
analytic tools for explaining and predicting the behavior of current Soviet elites. 26 The
Russian revolution just changed the locus of political power within the ruling group
from the bourgeois to the proletariat without changing the hegemonic position of the
Russians as the ruling social group. 27 In light of this argument, it is fair to describe the
Russian revolution as two dimensional: a horizontal dimension - a class-based
"top-down" social revolution, and a vertical dimension - a nationality-based revolution
without a revolution (i.e., a passive revolution).
The Russian Revolution also provided the Russians with a more effective
ideological basis for overcoming the society's contradictory consciousness. It gave the
man-on-the-street an ideological consciousness of his practical activity. This ideology
explained his practical activity, and as such attempted to reconcile the contradictory
consciousness inherent in the old regime. The hegemony of the Czarist state was
weakly founded. Imperialism is a weak ideological foundation for affecting consensus
rule. Russification for the masses only antagonized them by superimposing an
obviously foreign culture. On the other hand, an ideology like socialism proved more
useful for the Russians. The newly formed Soviet state was confronted with ethnic
problems, competing nationalisms and the general disintegration of Russian
dominance. Theodore H. VonLaue, in analyzing the Communist treatment of the
"nationality question" in the new Bolshevik state, observes that Russian hegemony was
maintained via a fundamental ideological paradox.
unqualified to lead the Socialist revolution. In a colonial empire like Russian and the
Soviet Union, such ideas challenged the continued national hegemony of the Russian
people. Galiev even proposed that the true revolutionary center-of-gravity lav not with
Russians but with Soviet Muslims and that the correct direction of the Russian
Revolution was East to Asia through Muslims rather than West to Europe through
Russians. Mir Sultan Galiev was purged by Stalin along with other non- Russian
national communists. Despite the rehabilitation of so manv of these non-Russian
national communists, and even Muslim national communists since 1956, Sultan Galiev
remains unrchabilitated. His ideas, called "Sultansalievism" remain a powerful native
Muslim ideological threat to the Russian socialist Hegemony. |Ref. 33:pp. 400-401 J F"or
more information on Muslim national communism see [Refs. 31,33].
For an excellent article on Russian nationalism's transmutation to Soviet
communism and the effects this has on Soviet foreign policy see Adam Ulam's chapter
on "Russian Nationalism" [Ref. 34].
Gramsci recognized that changes in the locus of political power within a ruling
group occurred. The democratic pluralist societies of the West were proof- one party
wins, another loses but the power remains within the bourgeoisie class. In the Soviet
case,, this change in locus was caused by a social revolution (not an election), was
relatively permanent, and involved a class-oased political party.
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The Communists encouraged spontaneity onlv to take away its substance in the
name of a hisher social order which 'prete'nded to grant all that had been
originally desired (and more). In reality it [i.e., this paradox] turned out to be a
more efficient version of Russian domination. [Ref. J2:p. 168]
This paradox attempted to resolve the contradictory consciousness that existed under
Czarist imperialism by appealing to an ideological ideal, namely a higher social order.
As a result, through socialism and the communist ideology, the Soviet regime both
maintained Russian rule, and established a greater degree of regime legitimacy (i.e.,
social consensus) than the Czarist empire enjoyed. 28
Marxism- Leninism, as an ideological basis for rule, is quite effective for
system-building. The old empire was crumbling apart, and various rebellious
nationality groups were fragmenting the state. The Marxism expounded by Lenin and
then more fully integrated back into Russian culture allowed the Russian Revolution to
change the horizontal layers of society without eradicating the dominance of Russian
nationalism. Alfred G. Meyer has postulated that all revolutions can be divided into
three distinct phases: system-destruction, an interregnum period, followed by a
system-building phase [Ref. 35:p. 7]. System-building allows for the development of a
new social order for civil society. The new regime must create new social institutions
to organize and manage society. The political superstructure of society must establish
their legitimacy within society (such as the Communist Party). In developing
legitimacy, these superstructures begin to rely less and less on terror and coercion to
affect their rule. Lastly, system-building
entails the creation and institution of social traditions and social myths, which
take the form of systematic and articulate "official" doctrine and must also be
seen in doctrinal taboos, that is, unmentionable topics glossed over or left out of
the official ideology. [Ref. 35:p. 7]
The communist ideology allowed this type of system-building to proceed and shaped its
course [Ref. 35:p. 7]. The set of social traditions and myths, ushered in by the Russian
Revolution, justified the elevated and preferred postion of things "Russian" throughout
the multiethnic state as part of the new offical doctrine, Marxism-Leninism.
28While communism is more effective than imperialism as an ideological basis -
at least in the short run - communist ideology may prove as ineffective as imperialist
ideology in overcoming civil society's contradictory consciousness in the long run.
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The communist ideology legitimized Russian hegemony in non-nationality
terms, while allowing Russian hegemony to fuse with Communist culture into
something called
'c
"Soviet," in which either form or content is Russian depending upon time and
circumstance, and in this manner, Russian goals and values are imposed upon the
non-Russian population in the name of science, progress, and historical
inevitability [Ref. 26:p. 16].
As a result, the ruling group, the Russian nationalists operating through the
Communist Party, now had an ideology capable not only of legitimizing rule, but also
capable of recruiting support. Thus, the new Soviet state which Lenin and Stalin built
fulfilled a basic requirement for hegemony: with it the ruling group "not only justifies
and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over
whom it rules." [Ref. 4:p. 244] With Communism as a national hegemonic ideology,
the Soviet State can and does affect Russian hegemonic rule.
3. The Soviet State: Hegemonic Apparatuses
The Soviet State is the primary hegemonic apparatus for Russian nationalism
and Russian communism. Yet, the Soviet State is not a perfect reflection of
Gramscian state theory. Gramsci defined the State as comprising two superstructural
levels - political society and civil society. Thus through both - political hegemony and
civil hegemony - rule is maintained and the State can encompass - overtly or covertly -
all hegemonic institutions. In the Soviet Union, this sort of division is overly
simplistic. As a socialist state, the economic base or infrastructure of the Soviet Union
is public property. Therefore, Gramsci's view of civil society as "all those organisms
called private" is misleading in the Soviet Union. Additionally, Gramsci's view of
political society as a superstructure comprised of all public institutions is also
misleading. Gramsci divided the hegemonic struggle between these two
superstructures, attributing coercion to public institutions and consensus building to
private institutions
a. The Soviet State: A Modified Gramscian Approach
A more apt view of the Soviet Union, using a modification of Gramsci's
theory, begins with an understanding of public property. The socialist mode of
production classifies all property except personal property as publicly owned property
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and outlaws privately owned property. 29 As a result, the traditional Gramscian
institutions of civil society - all privately owned - are in fact Soviet public property.
With this publicization of private property, civil society is no longer the "transmission
belt" of hegemonic ideas and values. This function has transferred to political society.
Civil society's institutional collapse leaves only three remaining private structures: the
individual, who can still choose to accept or reject hegemonic rule; those private
institutions largely outside of the ruling group control such as the family unit; and
those institutions which oppose hegemonic values and have not been silenced by
coercion such as dissent groups and underground "parallel" structures (i.e., unregistered
churches, and Islamic Sufi orders which "parallel" state-run churches and Muslim
mosques). These three structures, therefore represent the remnants of civil society in
the Soviet Union.
With Gramsci's division of hegemonic labor between two superstructures
theoretically compromised by Soviet civil society's institutional collapse, Soviet political
society has had to broaden its hegemonic role. The public owned institutions must
now perform both hegemonic roles: a transmission belt for developing a mass
consensus to hegemonic rule - an educator role, and an overt coercive force acting as a
vehicle of enforcement, punishment, and threat against those resisting hegemony - a
dictatorship role. Thus both roles are performed by the Soviet political superstructure.
Political society in the Soviet Union has an added dimension not envisioned
by Gramsci. Political society is a bifurcated superstructure - part Communist Party,
and part State structure or bureaucracy. Both parts parallel one another and reflect a
division of labor between policy initiation and supervision by the Party and policy
implementation by the State bureaucracy. Each part attempts to fulfill both
hegemonic roles, with the Party emphasizing the educatorship role, and the State
emphasizing the dictatorship role. 30 Government, at the apex of the Soviet State
In the Soviet Union, three categories of property are recognized as lesal:
state-owned property and collective-owned property, and personal property. The first
two categories are just forms of public property. The third category, personal
property, is the last remnant of private property and is quite Jimited in, scope. Personal
property describes all property which is a direct extension of the individual person and
includes among other things - a personal toothbrush, food items, home furniture, and
an automobile. The accumulation of too much personal property becomes classified as
private property and is therefore illegal.
30The Party exercises political power (i.e., sil) in the Soviet Union. As a result,
the Party monopolizes communist ideology and Soviet culture. These two. elements are
essential to Russian heeemony over the '"State of nations." While the ideology, was
originally German, it is Interpreted and reinterpreted by a Russian dominated political
party who exercises sole dominion over "politics." Soviet culture became the actual
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structure, is controlled by the political regime which in the Soviet case is largely the
Politburo of the CPSU. The Politburo, through democratic centralism, affects its rule
downward over the dual superstructures of Soviet political society - the Party
superstructure and the State bureaucratic superstructure - and over the masses of
Soviet civil society. The 1977 Brezhnev Constitution concept of "Soviet political
system" is congruent with this representation of the State in neo-Gramsci terms. This
discussion of the Soviet State, now defined in neo-Gramscian terms, permits a clearer
understanding of the hegemonic apparatus of Russian national dominance.
b. The Hegemonic Apparatuses
The hegemonic apparatuses of the Soviet Union are the dual
superstructures of Soviet political society. The first superstructure is the CPSU. The
primary hegemonic apparatus of the CPSU is its ideology. Most authors today discuss
Soviet ideology with a view towards foreign policy. Yet, ideology is extremely vital for
hegemonic rule. As stated earlier, the primary architects of Soviet ideology were
Russian national communists. The early vanguard party was as much a reflection of
Russian chauvinism as it was of its ideology. "From the very beginning of the Soviet
regime," observes Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "many features of historical tradition and
Russian culture have impregnated the Soviet interpretation of Marxism." [Ref. 12:p.
274] The influences of successive leaders have done little to eradicate that influence.
The Communist Party and its ideology continue to legitimize Russian dominance as
the "most equal among equals," and as the "elder brother." As a result, the CPSU as a
vanguard party has elevated the Russian nation to the status of a "vanguard nation."
A primary domestic mission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is
internal unity around a Russian national form of communism. Communist ideology is
intertwined with Russian hegemony. The Russian language is the "lingua franca" or
"the language of international communication" in the Soviet Union. Language is an
important part of national identity and national consciousness; it has been called the
"the touchstone of national identity." [Ref. 26:p. 16] Despite the practical reasons for
making Russian the State language (e.g., the need for over one hundred nations to
have a common tongue to communicate with), it has linguistically asserted to
extension of Russian culture throughout civil society. The Party serves to motivate,
encourage and educate civil society towards ideology and culture. On the other hand,
the State bureaucracy exercises political authority (i.e., vlast). It administers this
authority oyer civil society through public institutions. While these roles do not reflect
a true division of hegemonic labor, they do reflect a difference in hegemonic emphasis.
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non-Russians that the Soviet Union is a Russian state. Here again, the integration of
the "State of nations" revolves around a symbol of Russian identity. 31 Russian literacy
serves as a "transmission belt" for Russian culture and Marxist ideology. Additionally,
ideology justifies the development of a new man, a Soviet man free from nationalistic
trappings. The development of "Soviet men" is essential for complete unity and
assimilation of all Soviet nations into one Soviet nation. Yet, as Vernon Aspaturian
interprets the situation, this new Soviet man is really just a Communist Russian or a
Communist russianized non-Russian.
The vaunted "new Soviet man" allegedly emerging in Soviet society appears to be
a little more than an intensely more nationally conscious Russian in the Russian
areas of the country and a more or less russianized non-Russian in other areas .
. . As a consequence, not only the Russians but the non-Russians are "more
Russian" than they ever were under the overtly imperial Russian state of the
tsars. [Ref. 26:p. 19]
Therefore, the CPSU acting as an hegemonic apparatus and using ideological
arguments has created an image of the ideal Soviet citizen, who appears more Russian
than Soviet.
While the Communist Party tends to ideologically base and initiate Russian
hegemony, the State superstructure actually implements hegemony. The State
bureaucratic superstructure fulfills several roles. It serves as the "armor of coercion"
for hegemonic rule. Such public institutions as the army, the police and the judiciary
are part of the coercive arm of this superstructure. The State's distribution of
ministerial powers more towards the center (rather than the periphery), as well as the
new juridical goals of federalism (in the 1977 Constitution) as "the unifier of all the
nations and nationalities for building communism" are examples of state structures
promoting assimilation [Ref. 12:p. 122]. State institutions also perform a socializing
role, attempting to further integrate Soviet nationalities. Examples of these are the
universal state education system, the censored Soviet press, and the conscription
policies of the Soviet military. 32 Lastly, the State's command economy, which has
served to propel a backward empire to the modern age, is a hegemonic structure as
well. After all, any institution which serves to justify the rule of the dominant group
31 For a detailed look at the use of Russian in the Soviet Union as a tool for
national integration and Russian hegemony see [Refs. 12,26:pp. 165-189, 17-19].
32For more on these socializing institutions - the state structure, the education
system, the press, and military conscription - see [Ref. 12:pp. 121-189].
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and extend that rule through consensus is by definition an hegemonic structure.
Therefore, Soviet modernization, the increase in technical efficiency of the economic
infrastructure, has itself created a common self interest in more modernization, which
can draw diverse nations together. Brian Silver, in arguing for a greater scholarly
emphasis on the nonadversary aspects of Soviet nationality relations, emphasizes "the
existence of certain shared values among peoples of the USSR, above all the
commitment to economic development." [Ref. 36:p. 73] Zbigniew Brezinski argues a
similar point, that the gradual assimilation of non-Russians to Russian hegemony will
occur as a result of their modernization. He identifies engineers, technicians, and
scientists as the major assimilationists in all national groups. These assimilationists
maintain close relations with Russians. 34 For Brezinski, if economic growth continues,
then the Soviet Union will continue to enjoy both greater assimilation and greater
russification. [Ref. 37:p. 80] From the above discussion, Russian hegemony is both
ideologically based, culturally derived and largely State implemented. Hegemony, then,
serves as the basic mechanism of Soviet rule, and it is a hegemony based - to some
degree - on social consensus, not social conflict. Consensus, then, serves as the basis
of Soviet rule.
4. The Soviet State: Consensus and Coercion.
Gramsci's entire theory of hegemony is based on a "consensus model of
society." While the State may use coercion against fringe elements and those who
dissent, oppose or resist State authority, this is not the primary method for State rule.
Thus Gramsci reversed the Leninist emphasis on the State as a dictator. Gramsci also
dismissed infrastructural reasons for the longevity of bourgeois rule and the passivity of
Italy's proletariat. As a result, he discounted the role of State as a modernizer.
"Modernizer" means that the State has increased the technical efficiency with which it
The "adversary model" of Soviet nationality policy assumes an inherent conflict
between Russian interests and non-Russian or regional populations. Thus Russian
hegemony is always "conllictual" and non-Russians tend to resist pressures to
assimilate and lose autonomy. The "nonadversary model" assumes a commonality of
interest shared among the various Soviet nations. While Russian interests mav
dominate
t these interests are not necessarily ethnocentric nor in opposition with
non-Russian interests. [Ref. 36:p. 73]
Gramsci considered engineers, technicans, and scientists as part of the organic
intelligentsia of the various groups within civil society. ' They were the
"thinker-organizers" who were the leaders in the counterhegemonic movement. The
dominant group, as in the Soviet Union, relied on the support of these organic
intellectuals to maintain their hegemony. Today, despite the assimilation of these
elements of the organic thinker-orcanizers, other organic intellectuals still remain
unassimilated to lead a counterhegemonic movement.
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uses its economic base or infrastructure (i.e., the increased maximization of both
quantity and quality of output from a specific mode of production). Gramsci places
his emphasis on the educator role of a state. While the State will always rely on a
dictatorship, it will try and rely on an educatorship through hegemony.
In analyzing the Soviet case, however, each of these three roles plays a critical
importance. The Soviet Union is a dictatorship - ultimately, but it is also a modernizer
and an educatorship as well. The primary role in Stalinist times was the dictator role
as seen by the repetitive purges and the use of State terror. But Stalin's dictatorship
permitted both the modernization of backward nationalities and the State as a whole,
as well as the ideological transmutation of Russian nationalism into communist
ideology. Modernization has developed a consensus between the State and civil
society based on economic development. Additionally, ideology has to some degree
reshaped the thinking of Soviet civil society. Thus ideology serves to legitimize Soviet
actions and rule. In a conflict model of society, legitimation is a mute issue and not
really required or sought. But the Soviets continue to rely on ideological reasoning to
justify domestic and foreign policy. Even if one assumes civil society is largely
apathetic towards ideology, that does not discount a consensus model for Soviet civil
society; it only weakens the consent. Lastly, the modernization of society is itself
enough to produce consensus. Civil society "buys into" the dominant value system and
culture because it experiences the fruit of that hegemony's economic development.
Therefore, it is safe to say that Russian hegemonic rule through Russian communism is
largely consensual rather than purely conflictual36
With the Soviet State defined in neo-Gramscian terms as an hegemony, then
any successful revolutionary challenge must begin as a counterhegemony. Only via a
counterhegemony can a subordinate national group hope to overcome Soviet rule.
35Stalin's rule, while strongly emphasizing the coercive power of the State (i.e.,
the State as a dictatorship), also prepared the Soviet State for large scale economic
development and educated civil society with regards to communist ideology (i.e., the
State as both a modernizer and as an educator). Stalin's era laid the foundation for
developing consensus rule. Thus the lack of utility for a "totalitarian model" describing
the Soviets after 1956, has given way to a broader, more pluralist view.
36While the major portion of Russian hegemonic rule is effected by consensus as
opposed to conflict, Russian hegemonic rule still remains a mix of "both of .these
elements. The presence of both consensus and conflictual elements within a particular
state is compatible with Gramscian theory. Gramsci himself never, specified an exact
mix, only that consensus was greater than conflict. Gramsci recognized that
hegemonic situations vary in intensity from state to state. While Soviet hegemony is
not necessarily "successful" or "integral" hegemony and may in fact be proceeding
towards a state-wide "decadent" variety, the dominant model for Soviet society is still
consensus rule, and not conflict rule.
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Therefore, despite Paul Goble's assertion that "given the disproportion between the
organizational, ideological, and coercive resources of the Soviet state and those of the
nationalities in the USSR, the task of managing national relations has usually not been
impossible" [Ref. 38:p. 83], it may, in fact, prove otherwise. A counterhegemony is
growing in Central Asia which may in reality make this task impossible.
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IV. THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN CHALLENGE:
COUNTERHEGEMONY
The Soviet Central Asian challenge is a complex phenomena, and represents the
strongest geographic region of Muslim resistance to Soviet rule today. The challenge
itself is a counterhegemonic movement based on a Muslim culture and ideology quite
contrary to Russian national communism. The Western literature has characterized
this challenge as ethnic unrest, failed Soviet nationality policy, and as an Islam revival
movement - but never as a counterhegemonic movement. Nevertheless, a
neo-Gramscian framework provides the proper theoretical perspective to describe and
explain this phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to apply Gramsci's theories to
the Central Asian challenge. From the theoretical perspective established in Chapter
Two, a counterhegemonic movement must establish a "counter-culture" capable of
creating a contradictory consciousness among civil society, overcoming the dominant
group's hegemony and eventually surrounding the hegemonic apparatuses of the State.
In Soviet Central Asia today, three forces form the basis of the counterhegemony:
Muslim population growth, the strength of Islamic religious practices and the national
identity of the Central Asians. These three "counterhegemonic forces" are supported
by three "counterhegemonic apparatuses" - the Muslim family, "unofficial" Mullahs
and Central Asian Muslim intellectuals. Lastly, Gramsci's theories point to one goal -
social revolution. In evaluating the current counterhegemonic challenge, one must also
analyze the "counterhegemonic prospects" for the future.
A. COUNTERHEGEMONIC FORCES
Three key forces form the basis of Central Asia's developing counterhegemony:
population growth, Islam, and national identity. The literature is full of evidence and
analysis on these three forces and their corresponding components such as: a Central
Asian labor surplus, Soviet Sufism, Russian language literacy, nationality power, and
Muslims in the military. This section will not attempt to prove the validity of these
issues, but rather using the works of foremost Western scholars, outline some of the
key particulars."
37Currently, the single-best short discussion of these Central Asian issues is
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1. Muslim Population Gro>v1h
Currently the entire Soviet population is experiencing a shrinking growth rate.
From 1970 to 1979, according to official Soviet census for those years, the average
growth of the Soviet population as a whole slowed to 0.92 percent per year. However,
during this period the Muslim population experienced a population boom. The
Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union collectively managed the highest growth rate at
2. 17 percent per year, while the Russian population slowed down to 0.7 percent per
year. [Ref. 2:p. 125] Soviet Central Asia accounted for 30 percent of all Soviet
population growth. 38 By the year 2000, Central Asia is expected to account for 50
percent of the Soviet population growth. [Refs. 44,45:pp. 40-41, 3] If the Muslim
population growth continues at a relatively constant rate, by the year 2000 the total
population of the Soviet Union will be 300 to 310 million, with 66 to 75 million
Muslims (or 22 to 25 percent of the total Soviet population). Approximately 50
million Muslims will be concentrated in Central Asia forming an extremely strong.
Muslim-Turkic minority in Moscow's peripheral region. 40
This fertility rate differential between Muslims and Slavs in the Soviet Union
is reflective of more fundamental cultural differences. Slavs, especially Russian Slavs,
associate an improved standard of living with improved material conditions. Therefore,
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's article "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and
Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule [Ref. 39]. Additionally, Michael Rywkin's book,
Moscow's Muslim Challenge, and the Bennigsen and Broxup book, The Islamic Threat
to the Soviet Union, serve as excellent overview sources for understanding these
counterhegcmonic issues [Refs. 2.27]. For those desiring a deeper understanding of the
historical background of these forces see [Refs. 1,28,40,411. Lastlv, the most'current
general works to date on these issues or related issues are [Refs. 42,43].
*2 O
Uzbekistan alone accounted for 20 percent of the total Soviet population
growth during this period.
Some Soviet experts disagree with this assumption. They predict the Soviet
Muslim birth rate will decline over time. One such expert is Ye. D. Grazhdannikov
(see [Ref. 46:pp. 100-101]). This view is not widely accepted, especially in the West.
40The Russian, population, by the year 2000, is expected to grow between 150
million and 175. million. The higher number (i.e., 175 million) accounts for projected,
non-demographic additions to the Russian population through the assimilation of
non-Russian national groups. The three Slavic ethnic groups (i.e., Great Russian,
\Vhite Russians or Bclorussians. and Little Russians or Ukrainians) will account for a
little
.
over 200 million to 225 million people (includes assimilated non-Russian
Russians). [Ref. 2:pp. 130-1311 However, the republics of Central Asia proper had a
1979 population of 25,483,000 people of whom only 3,108,000 are Slavs (or 12
percent). Therefore, the Slavic population is not only declining in growth, but is also a
small - but powerful - minority in this region. (Based on [Ref. 27:pp. 62-63].)
Additionally, almost all of the titular nationalities of Central Asia proper live in
Central Asia; 99.3 percent of the Uzbeks, 99.0 percent of the Kirghiz, 99.2 percent of
the Tajiks and 97.8 percent of the Turkomens live in Soviet Central Asia [Ref. 2:p.
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a natural result of this cultural perspective is the deliberate planning of small families.
This reduces family expenses and allows for more disposable "rubles." The Slavic
peoples living in a predominately urban oriented environment (i.e., Western USSR)
bordering on a consumer society, have chosen "the good life" over having children.
[Ref. 27:p. 65] While the Soviet State as a "modernizer" has led to a decline in Slavic
births based on Slavic cultural values, the Muslim population had not "bought into"
that part of Russian cultural hegemony.
The Muslim population has maintained its traditional cultural values and
norms with regard to the family. Therefore, Central Asians look upon large families as
proof of 'the good life." Solomon Bruk, a leading Soviet demographer, attributes this
pattern to the survival of traditional marital-sexual habits, including Muslim
community pressure against both divorce and childless marriages. This cultural
differential is further highlighted by the commitment of Muslim fathers to their
families. A Muslim father spends 2.5 times as much time with his family as a Russian
father spends with his family. [Ref. 27:p. 66] Additionally, according to a 1977 Soviet
statistical source, Russian mothers are expected to have about two children. 41 On the
other hand, the same study showed no one statistical peak for Muslim women.
Rather, the data reflected a relatively consistent response increase: fifteen percent of
the Muslim mothers wanted four children, another fifteen percent wanted five children,
and so on through nine-plus children. Therefore, about 85 percent of the Muslim
women expected to have a large family of four or more children, while 90 percent of
the Russian women expected never to have a family larger than four children, and most
of these Russian women expected to have small families (i.e., zero to two children).
These very different cultural perspectives on the family have shaped demographic
differentials like these: a gross reproduction rate between 2.15 and 2.91 for the Central
Asian republics (1978-1979), versus 0.93 to 1.00 gross reproduction rates for all-Slavic
republics during the same period. [Ref. 27:pp. 65-66, 70] Therefore, while Russian
hegemony has permitted dominant group rule, it has not erased all cultural differences
within Soviet society. Muslim family values appear to lie largely outside Russian
hegemony and shape the demographic element of Central Asian counterhegemony.
41 Sixty percent of the Russian women surveved expected to have two children,




Much of the Soviet Muslim value system remains heavily influenced by Islam.
In 1979, a high-ranking Soviet Party official admitted in Kommunist "that Islam,
contrary to all expectations of the Soviet leadership, is more deeply rooted than any
other religion or confession in the Soviet Union." [Ref. 47:p. 115] Additionally, he
thought that Islamic traditions and customs were especially tenacious. Soviet Muslims
today adhere strongly to "ancient traditions" and "age-old customs" such as the
"traditional life cycle rituals" of a Muslim's life.
These traditions and customs to a great extent go hand in hand with, or are even
identical to, the religious codes of conduct to which Muslims, in the
"brotherhood of all true believers," are subject . . . today nearly all [Soviet]
Muslims have their sons circumcised, that the celebration of Ramadan is nearlv
universal, that marriages according to Islamic rites (immediately after the civil
ceremony) are still widespread, and that there is even a demand on the part of
large sections of the community for burial in Islamic cemeteries, with the result
that such funerals are commensurately common. In the "godless" environment of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, particularly ereat significance is to be attributed to the
practice of religious convictions in this form. [Ref. 47:p. 119]
The majority of Soviet Muslims still pursue life cycle rituals, and "the Muslim way of
life," which includes several customs that favor large families. These customs include
strict Muslim sexual morality, the early marriages of daughters, the traditional Islamic
ban of birth control, "the payment of kalym [bride price], polygamy (camouflaged, of
course), extreme respect of the elders (aqsaqalism), religious marriage, circumcision,
and all religious burials." [Ref. ll:pp. 119, 127] Traditional life cycle rituals are widely
observed in both rural and urban areas, even among the intelligentsia and important
party members. These rituals mark the Muslim consciousness of Central Asians (and
all Soviet Muslims). As a result, despite official Soviet opposition to circumcision, the
entire weight of Muslim social opinion makes this ritual almost universal. Therefore,
circumcision is a symbol of Muslimhood and in all areas of Central Asia one can hear
illiterate elders and young educated men state "he who is not circumcised is not an
Uzbek" (or a Turkmen, or a Tajik, etc. as appropriate). The presence and practice of
these rituals reflect the strong influence of Muslim social consciousness (i.e., a Muslim
"we"), as well as the effectiveness of social and family pressure in overcoming
russianized Soviet culture. Additionally, these traditional attitudes also contribute to
the lack of Muslim marital "internationalization" (i.e., the breakdown of national
identity through ethnic intermarriage), and the continued influence of a Muslim social
49
consciousness to each succeeding generation. [Ref. 39:pp. 48-51] Even Muslim atheists
and official non-believers follow, in varying degrees, these religious based rituals,
evidencing the broader national implication of the Islamic religion.42
Part of Islam's survival as both a faith and a way of life can be explained by
the presence of official Islam. Official Islam represents the "adaptive style" of Islam
where religious leaders adapt to and compromise with the State when it is necessary for
the maintenance of Islam. As a result, this "adaptive style" is still orthodox despite its
liberalized practice. [Ref. 48:p. 146]
From the standpoint of Islamic law and theology, Islam in the USSR is the same
unadulterated, pure religion that it had been before 1917, and its leaders, though
formally submissive to the godless Soviet regime, have never been accused Bv
anyone - friends or adversaries - of heresy (shirq), infidelity (kufr), or even
innovation (bida). [Ref. 49:p. 39]
As a result, official Soviet Islam remains an accepted member of the worldwide Islamic
milieu.
Official Islam, since the end of World War II has enjoyed an ambiguous
position in the Soviet Union similar to that of Russian Orthodoxy:
On the one hand, the Soviet Communist Party has sought to eradicate this faith
[Islam] in campaigns of varying intensity. On the other nand, the Muslim leaders
have judged it expedient to give full support to Soviet policies as the price for the
continued existence of their institutions. [Ref. 50:p. 429]
Official Islam is represented by the muftis of four Muslim Spiritual Boards, the largest
and most influential being in Tashkent, and representing Central Asian Muslims.
Originally, official Islam was to serve two roles for Russian hegemony. First, it was to
serve the Soviet Union abroad as regime propagandists. Secondly, it was to serve as a
"transmission belt" for Soviet ideology and a guaranteer of Muslim loyalty to the State.
In the Soviet Union, onlv about 20 percent of the Muslims declare themselves
as atheists. The remainder - 80 percent - represent various levels of belief: , "by
personal conviction, by tradition, or under trie pressure of the familv 'milieu'.
'
[Ref. 1 1 :p. 127] But even official atheists continue to practice the three basic Islamic
rites: circumcision, Islamic marriage, and Islamic burial.
According to all recent surveys, these family rites are performed bv 95 to 99
percent of the Muslim population. The survey reveals this curious phenomenon
and lends support to the theory that absolute atheists do not exist in Muslim
lands. [Ref. Ip. 1]
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However, the role of official Islam has grown beyond these two. Today, official Islam
no longer sees itself in opposition to Soviet ideology, or intellectually inferior to it.
Rather, official Islam traces socialism back directly to Islamic roots - communism did
not begin with the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. During an Islamic conference of
the Muslims in Tashkent in September 1970, a leading participant stated:
I admire the genuis of the prophets who proclaimed the social principles of
socialism. I am pleased that a large number of socialist principles are nothing
other than the realization of Muhammad's instructions. [Ref. 47:p. 119]
Therefore, official Islam today is not only supporting communism, but supplanting its
European and Russian roots with Islamic roots, and undercutting Russia's role as a
'vanguard nation." Additionally, official Islam has adapted Islamic institutions to the
realities of Soviet life, thus allowing Muslims to actively participate in State and Party
social organizations without acting in a manner contrary to Koranic norms. These
"new" Islamic institutions, therefore, tend to preserve, not eradicate, the Islamic
heritage of all Soviet Muslims. [Ref. 47:p. 118] Lastly, Soviet muftis are maintaining
the existence of a skeletonic but necessarv religious establishment . . . and
guaranteeing] the survival of Soviet Islam by preserving its purity and its hish
intellectual level .... Without such a framework, the conservative, underground
Islam would relapse into ignorance, superstition and shamanism. [Ref. ll:p. 129]
Therefore, the presence of official Islam permits the practice of a effective, more
powerful Islam: unofficial Islam.43
"Underground," "unofficial," "parallel," or "popular" Islam represents the
illegal Islam practiced by Soviet civil society. While the Spiritual Boards administer
"official" Islam, mystical Sufism administers "parallel" Islam.44 Sufism is not a sect, a
heresy, or a schismatic Islamic movement; rather, it is the mystical face of orthodox
Islam. Alexander Bennigsen concludes that Islam in the Soviet Union has survived
primarily because of "the resistance offered by the well-organized and dedicated
.
Interestingly enough, despite continuous efforts of Soviet authorities to use
official Islam against "unofficial" Islam, Soviet Muslim muftis do not condemn parallel,
underground Islam as illegal, and no serious conllict has occurred between the two.
[Ref. fl:p. 129]
For a detailed and thorough discussion of Soviet Sufism, see the December
1983 special edition of Central Asian Survey (volume 2, number 4) which is dedicated to
the subject.
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representatives of the conservative 'parallel Islam' rather than because of the activity of
the official Muslim establishment, which is loyal to the Soviet regime." [Ref. 51:p. 82]
Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay echoes this conclusion and states
Islam survives in the USSR mainly because of the existence of what is termed
"parallel" or "unofficial" Islam, a complex underground secret or semi-secret
establishment which is much better organized and more dynamic than the official
Muslim hierarchy. [Ref. 52:p. 5]
Thus, unoffical Islam performs a vital role which has insured the continued presence of
an Islamic faith and an Islamic way of life in the Soviet Union.
Parallel Islam is essential not only to the Islamic identity of Soviet Muslims
but also to their Islamic revival. In pre-Soviet times, "much of the practice of Islam
was performed outside of the mosque by Sufi brotherhoods." [Ref. 39:p. 44] However,
during the Stalinist era, most people retreated from openly practicing Islam. Not until
the 1960's and 1970's do Central Asian Soviet sources reveal the expansion of Sufism
among Turkomens, Uzbek, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks [Ref. 52:p. 17]. Today it is not
uncommon to find Soviet sources discussing the revival of Soviet Islam and Sufi
influence. In July 1979, the First Secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party
spoke about "the growing influence of Islam." [Ref. 47:p. 120] The Soviet press makes
numerous attacks on "the activities of 'self-appointed' (or 'nonregistered') mullahs,
clandestine religious schools and illegal mosques run by adepts of the Sufi orders, and
the activity surrounding 'holy places'."45 [Ref. 53:pp. 31-32] Additionally, these Sufi
brotherhoods represent a closed, non-Soviet society. In fact, the adepts live practically
outside the Soviet society. Sufi organizations have even succeeded, in some cases, of
infiltrating and dominating traditional institutions: guilds, clanic courts, and the village
assemblies. One Soviet source in 1973 even asserts that "not infrequently illegal clan
courts reverse the decisions of Soviet Justice." [Ref. 52:pp. 20, 33(n25)] Additionally,
Sufi orders operate unofficial prayer houses, perform the life cycle rituals and
community rites and represent the "non-mosque"trend. The presence of Sufi "mullahs"
or "ishans" who are more numerous than official mullahs, is essential to the growth of
Islam in the Soviet Union. These Sufi leaders and their orders not only serve as a
"counterhegemonic apparatus" (to be discussed later), but also allow Islam to be a
45These Central Asian "holy places", are usually associated with a former Sufi
saint and serve as centers for domestic pilgrimages [Ref. 53:p. 32].
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"counterhegemonic issue." Through "unofficial" Islam, "the Islamic Weltanschauung [of
Central Asians] not only survives but seems to have experienced a revival." [Ref. 39:p.
44]
Sufism also represents a counterhegemonic issue in its own right - beyond just
encouraging an Islamic counter-culture. Sufism "is intolerant (Soviet sources use the
expression 'fanatic'), conservative, anti-modernistic, anti-Occidental, violently
anti-Russian and, finally, anti-Communistic." [Ref. ll:p. 129] The small, decentralized,
closed Sufi societies or tariqa "represents the hard core of anti-Russian and
anti-communist sentiments, . . . [and] conduct permanent intense religious and
nationalistic propaganda." [Ref. 52:p. 29] Sufi orders represent the only social and
political mass organization in Central Asia other than the Communist Party. They
have a long history of clandestine resistance to Russian rule and political activity.
Although Sufism has no "political program," it formed the backbone of various Central
Asian rebellions - including the Basmachi revolt of the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, "the
prestige of Sufi brotherhoods is greatest where resistance to the infidels [i.e., Russians]
was most energetic" like the Ferghana Valley and Southern Turkmenistan [Ref. 52:p.
25]. Additionally, the tariqa in some areas are closely tied to extended families and
clans. Several Soviet sources estimate that nearly 50 percent of the Sufi followers join
the tariqa for family reasons, 25 percent due to personal conviction and the remaining
25 percent due to unknown reasons. Today one finds a growing proportion of
intellectuals - urban and rural - choosing to join these orders, and support their
anti-Russian, anti-Communist stance. While the total number of "fanatical believers"
or Sufi followers is relatively small (only around 1 1 percent of Central Asia's total
Muslim population), they remain the most militant element of Soviet Islam's
counter-culture. [Ref. 52:pp. 25-26]
3. Muslim National Identity
"The Islamic culture," according to Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "is at the
base of Central Asian Muslims' new national self-perception." [Ref. 39:p. 56] But
Islam serves as only one component part, the other part being their common history
(or heritage) as a Turkestani people. These two components tend to shape the Soviet
Central Asian Muslim national consciousness as a transethnic "we".
Islam provides Soviet Central Asia with a common culture for both believers
and non-believers. Talib Sarymasakovich Saidbaev views Islam as a surviving
integrative force shaping national identity.
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Because of the widely held perception in the psychology of society which
identifies the religious with the national sense of identitv, Islam is a force that
unites believers and non-believers into one nation, and creates a feeling of unity
between the representatives of various nations which profess Islam in the past.
This Muslim, unity has nothing in common with the unity which currently exists
between nations of the Soviet Union. But it should be noted the more so
because it manifests itself in daily life. [Refs. 54,39:pp. 193,56-57]
Islam, then, is both a religious force and a national force; life cycle rituals hold
significance for both religious and national cultures. Even for non-believers, Islam
provides a cultural cohesion for Central Asians. Therefore, Sufism is a guardian of
both Islam and national traditions. This dual role of Islam is essential to
understanding the Islamic basis for a
.
transethnic national identity. "The
religion-nationalism linkage . . . forms a part of the self-perception of the Soviet
Muslim community in Central Asia." [Ref. 39:p. 57] Central Asians, fearful of a loss of
identity in a "merger" with the Russian nation, view the preservation of their identity as
bound to the preservation of Islam. Islam both shaped their national heritage and
continues to shape their national spirit. Thus, when Russian hegemonic organizations
encourage anti-religious movements and the transformation of Muslim culture into
Russian-inspired Soviet culture, Muslim nationalists resist. Without Islam it is unlikely
that a traditional national culture would still exist in Central Asia.
The Central Asian national consciousness has been shaped as a transethnic
identity by many forces. Islam provides the simple dichotomy of the world ih the
"Abode of Islam" and the "House of War" (i.e., Dar ul-Islam and Dar al-Harb
respectively), which creates a Muslim "we" and a non-Muslim "they". Prior to the
Russian revolution, Russia considered all its Muslims as members of one nation - the
Nation of Islam - the Russian equivalent of the Ottoman "millet" concept which
combines religion and nation. The primary distinction was religious, with linguistic
and ethnic distinctions remaining vague and secondary. In Central Asia during this
time, the primary inter-millet distinction was between nomads and sedentaries, as
opposed to ethnic distinctions. Therefore, all Central Asian sedentaries regardless of
ethnicity were called "Sarts" or merchants. Within the Russian Muslim Millet, all
ethnic groups formed one nation with one culture, history and tradition. However, this
millet was also divided up geographically into three regions representing regional
differences. On region was Turkestan which formed a sub-millet - a Central Asian
Millet. [Ref. 2:pp. 35-37]
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Central Asia or Turkestan during the pre-Bolshevik era reflected the
unquestionable link between Islam and Turkestani self-identity. But the collective
identity of Turkestanis was relatively weak and fractured. Turkestanis viewed
themselves as Muslims and "either as residents of a particular village or town or
members of a certain clan or tribe." [Ref. 55:p. 365] While pan-Turkic ideas were
gaining popularity among parts of the Central Asian intelligentsia, the masses of civil
society had no such common consciousness despite their common historical
background. The Basmachi revolt,46 according to Martha Olcott, played a crucial role
in establishing a greater collective national identity among Central Asians.
The Basmachi played a critical role in the political modernization of Turkestan
by bringing together the various elements of Central Asian society in a effort to
defeat a common enemy, and through this action the basis of a common
consciousness was formed. For the first time the Turkestanis began to develop a
political identity, primitive and partially submerged though it was. In the shared
act of resistance people began to perceive a sense of community and shared fate .
. . . The rebellion brousht people from throughout Turkestan into contact with
each other, and they realized that they were all trying to protect the same thing.
For the first time social cleavages became less important, as the Central Asians
placed an increased emphasis on what they shared: a certain wav of life, similar
languages and customs, and of course, the same religion, Islam. [Ref. 55:p. 365]
The Basmachi Revolt brought this Central Asian Millet into a stronger sense of
national consciousness by its resistance to the Soviets.
At the same time, Muslim National Communists in Central Asia sought the
development of a single Central Asian State. During the first seven years of the new
Soviet State, the old Czarist administrative division of the area along historical and
geographic lines (not ethnic lines) called the General Government of Turkestan was
maintained and renamed the Autonomous Republic of Turkestan. The former two
protectorates were merged into one People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm. The
first Central Asian Muslim Bolsheviks believed in the eventual merging of these
administrative divisions into one unified Central Asian state, Soviet Turkestan, around
one common nation, Turkestan. While several spoken languages would exist, a single
The Uzbek word "basmach" means bandit. The Basmachis were a rural-based
resistance movement which intermittently foueht the Bolshevik regime from 1918 to
1936.. Sufi orders and tribal leaders were actively involved, in addition to pure highway
bandits. 1 he Basmachis sought to overthrow the Russian control of Turkestan, but
had no real political nrocram'othcr than the political autonomy (or national liberation)
of Central Asia. I Ret. 56:pp. 319-320(nl)l For more oh this movement, see
[Refs. 29,55,56]
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administrative language called Chagatay would be used.47 Yet Stalin prevented the
reachievement of a unified Turkestani state.48 By subdividing the region's Turkic
groups along subethnic linguistic lines, national territories were artificially created. The
current national consciousness reflects the diversity of Central Asia's history - religious,
regional, ethnic, and subethnic linguistic consciousness threads all woven together form
their identity.
Today's Central Asian national consciousness is a complex issue. Despite the
centripetal nature of the Soviet nationality policy, a clanic-tribal consciousness still
remains. Additionally, the centrifugal trend of subdividing Central Asia has produced a
derived national identity tied to the various republics. This is especially true among
Uzbeks. However, there is also a historically and culturally based transethnic national
consciousness as Central Asian Muslims. Moreover, two transnational consciousnesses
also exist. The first is the larger Muslim consciousness as part of "Dar ul-Islam." The
other is the contrived Soviet consciousness. Within Central Asia, no single national
consciousness exists. However, all but the Soviet consciousness synthesizes together to
form a Central Asian "we" quite opposed to a Russian "they". Nancy Lubin, in her
article "Assimilation and Retention of Ethnic Identity in Uzbekistan," observes that
Uzbeks are "deeply proud of the things which make them different from Russians -
their large families, their courtyards, their native food and markets, their elaborate
festivals and ceremonies." She concludes that as individuals, Uzbeks have a
multifaceted consciousness.
As a group, therefore, they are no longer united in perceiving themselves as
Muslims, as Turkic speakers, or as a closely-knit Uzbek tribe. What they are
united in feeling, however, is the sense that they - Uzbeks, Asians, Muslims, or
however they may define themselves individually - are different Irom the
Russians, Europeans, or "infidels" in their midst. [Ref. 57:pp. 284,285]
Hence, in measuring the multifaceted national consciousness of Central Asians, one
must define this consciousness both from the perspective of "what Central Asians are"
as well as "what Central Asians are not." Within that boundary lies a Central Asian
Muslim identity rooted in Islam, in its national past and in its rejection of the
47Chagatay, an academic literarv language, appeared in the late 15th century. It
was used by all Central Asian intellectuals as a "pan- Turkic" language. [Ref. 2:p. 42]
48A unified Turkestani state previously existed under Emperor Timur
(Tamerlane).
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Russianness of Soviet society49 - Russian language, Russian identity, and even Russian
architecture. 50 Hence, Central Asia's multifaceted national consciousness still reflects a
large scale rejection of Russian hegemony.
4. Central Asia's Contradictor}' Consciousness
Gramsci considered the intensity of hegemonic social structures to vary over
time. When the mass consent of subordinate groups to dominant group culture and
ideology (i.e., hegemony) is only superficial, a "contradictory consciousness" can exist.
In Central Asia, a contradictory consciousness appears to exist. While this
contradictory consciousness is not as precise a dichotomy as Gramsci's theory would
suggest (i.e., a contradiction between the explicit and implicit consciousnesses), Central
Asians reflect on the practical plane a reduction in individual commitment to Russian
national communism. On the abstract plane, the Muslim man-on-the-street may or
may not endorse the dominant ideology - Russian communism. But through his
adherence to Muslim family values, life cycle rituals, Islamic practices, and an
anti-Russian national consciousness, an obvious contradiction exists. Helene Carrere
d'Encausse's "Homo Islamicus" testifies to the duality of consciousness among Soviet
Muslims. Homo Islamicus "simply by his existence, by his presence in the whole area
where the Muslim civilization has existed, he bears witness that the Soviet people have
at least two components: the Soviets and the Soviet Muslims." [Ref. 12:p. 264] The
"Soviets" to whom she makes reference are really those people within the Soviet state
who accept Russian hegemony without contradiction, and the Soviet Muslims are
those who by their behavior bear witness to a fundamental Muslim contradiction in
consciousness. This Muslim contradictory consciousness implies the Russian Soviets
only have a "decadent" hegemony in Muslim areas, especially in Central Asia. A
decadent hegemony like this is a vulnerable hegemony, possessing an ambivalent,
inconsistent consciousness among Muslim civil society. While this contradiction is not
enough to provoke a revolution, it is sufficient to erupt in protests, riots, and
demonstrations of discontent. Therefore, when Wimbush and Alexiev state that
"large-scale anti-Soviet rioting in recent years in Tashkent, Dushanbe, Chimkent, and
other Central Asian cities also testifies that Soviet Muslims continue to resent Soviet
For a contradictory position, that Central Asian nationalism and Islam are not
parts of a "crystallized national identity" see a minority position expressed by Alistair
McAuley [Ref 58]. ' ' * V y
For an interesting account of a petition from 88 Kirghiz villagers concerning
the need for Kirghiz traditions in housing construction see [Ref. 59:p. 2f].
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oppression," [Ref. 60:p. 3] they are describing a decadent Russian hegemony in Central
Asia which is experiencing a simple eruption of the Muslim contradictory
consciousness. When Rasma Karklins quotes Soviet German emigrants from Central
Asia in a 1979 study as saying that now the Kirghiz people "could get along without
the Russians, now they have even surpassed them" or "for the Russians too, it is
getting difficult to live in Kazakhstan" or "I was in a sanatorium where all others were
Turkmen; I heard talk about wanting to succeed from the Soviet Union" or "the
Turkmen want their people in the leading positions." [Ref. 61:pp. 76-77] These quotes
are specific evidences of non-Muslims (i.e., Soviet Germans) testifying about what
Gramsci would call a Muslim contradictory consciousness. 51 The presence of this
Muslim contradictory consciousness among Soviet Central Asians is essential to the
developing counterhegemonic movement. As the contradictory consciousness of civil
society grows,
.
and the contradiction becomes more and more a hegemonic
discontinuity, the counterhegemonic movement will become stronger.
B. COUNTERHEGEMONIC APPARATUSES
The Central Asian counterhegemonic movement is fueled by three
counterhegemonic apparatuses: the Muslim family, Sufi orders and leaders, and
Central Asian intellectuals. A counterhegemonic apparatus permits the spread of
counterhegemonic ideas, issues and forces throughout civil society. However, in the
Soviet case, given the lack of private institutions, civil society has collapsed down to
the masses, the family structure, and those institutions which continue to operate
despite the State's coercive power. For Gramsci, a counterhegemony developed
primarily within the institutions of civil society. Therefore, two of these apparatuses -
the Muslim family and Sufi orders - are found within that part of civil society which
the State failed to remove. These two apparatuses have found a third "ally" in the
Muslim intellectuals. Together, these three propel the counterhegemony along.
One wonders if those Turkmen were in the
.
sanatorium because their
"anti-socialist behavior" had caused socialist "mental disorders", or because their
contradictory consciousness was evidenced by "anti-socialist behavior."
Not all contradictory consciousness is the. same in degjee or strength. While
Sufi adepts would appear to be operating with a hich degree ol contradiction, the vast
masses who only adhere to the three basic life-cycle rituals would appear to possess
low degree of contradiction. Due to this lack of a high degree of contradiction
throughout all of Central Asian civil society, the counterhegemony is still in the
process of developing. What is needed by Western analysts now is access to
information about Central Asians and study, on the true breadth and depth of their
actual consciousness (both implicit and explicit). Such access appears impossible. For
an example of a similar study done in Yugoslavia, see [Ref. 62].
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1. The Muslim Family
The Muslim family both maintains the practice of the Muslim counter-culture
and passses that counter-culture on to the next generation. Thus, a key attribute of
this apparatus is its ability to develop counterhegemonic attitudes prior to the Soviet
State's ability to develop an acceptance of hegemonic attitudes. The Soviet's
themselves highlight this instrumental role of the family.
Unfortunately, there are substantial shortcomings in upbringing work among
young people [in Turkmenistan], shortcomings that often manifest themselves in
deviations irom socialist morality and observance of old customs and traditions.
A young person's views and actions are influenced by his environment [i.e..
family]. , And often that environment serves to . distort his consciousness and
"transmits" vestiges of the past to him. In a family in which the mother strictlv
sees to it that her daughter or daughter-in-law observes old rituals, . . . young
people may grow up acquiring views that have nothing in common with Soviet
morality .... Religious customs persist, in part, because as they are passed on
from one generation" to the next, they are often presented as something national
or folkloric. Sociological polling conducted in various districts of Turkmenia has
shown that grandparents sometimes refuse to live with young families or help
them care for the children unless the families observe old customs . . . the
process of consolidation of the socialist familv is being impeded bv backward
parents who try to force young couples to adhere to traditional customs. Yet
these customs objectively serve to promote the ideologv of Islam and encourage
ideas of religious exclusivity. These relicious traditions hinder the establishment
of new, socialist, family relationships. [Kef. 63:pp. 20-21]
This problem for the Soviets is nothing more than the Muslim family socializing the
next generation in religious and nationalistic ways. The Muslim mother appears
particularly influential over her children. Both educated and uneducated Moslem
mothers socialize their children in this manner. "Virtually every Moslem woman
considers the inculcation of religious views to be an integral part of her childrearing
duties .... There are no universal methods of education to counter women's
religiousness." [Ref. 64:p. 14] Therefore, the Muslim family's influence, especially the
mother's influence is an essential element in allowing the counterhegemony to grow
with each progressive generation.
The Muslim family also serves another important role; it demographically
expands the movement by its large family size. The family not only socializes the next
generation with counterhegemonic ideas, but it makes the next generation larger. The
2.15 to 2.91 gross reproduction rate for Central Asian republics (1978-1979) represents
a very effective counterhegemonic apparatus [Ref. 27:p. 66]. For Gramsci, the
counterhegemony grew by the spread of ideas through private institutions
counterhegemonicly controlled. For Central Asia, the spread of ideas is largely
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through the high reproduction rate of the Central Asian Muslim family. This "la
vengeance des berceaux" factor can permit the Central Asians counterhegemony to
eventually surround the Soviet State in Central Asia. Thus, the growing ethnic
imbalance can be destabilizing to the Soviets due to its counterhegemonic significance.
2. Sufism and Sufi Leaders
Sufism in Central Asia fulfills several roles for the counterhegemonic
movement. First, it preserves the purity of the Islamic religion for the 'population
[Ref. 52:p. 30]. Second, since Islamic and nationalistic customs are tightly interwoven,
Sufism serves as a protectorate of Central Asian Muslim culture, traditions and values.
Islam represented by Sufism, appears as the guardian of national, moral and
cultural values, which implies that a negative attitude towards the faith of the
ancestors . . . would amount to "national" treason." [Ref. 52:p. 20]
Third, Sufism provides the Central Asians - the masses and the intellectuals - with a
counter-ideology:
For. the believers and more broadly for all those who are not satisfied with the
spiritual vulgarity of Marxism-Leninism, Sufism represents the exact opposite of
compulsory diamat (dialectical materialism), while the tariqa provides a perfect
organized framework which enables those who join it to escape the dreary reality
oFSoviet life and to venture into another world. [Ref. 52:p. 3D]
Fourth, Sufism develops the national consciousness of Central Asians as a non-Russian
"we." This consciousness has political overtones and has historically been a part of
Central Asian Sufism. Eugene Schuyler testified to the political nature of Central
Asian Sufi orders back in the late 1800s. Sufi sermons had both religious and political
messages.
Instances of their [i.e., Sufi leader's] treasonable language [towards Russial were
only too well proved because officers, frequently in passing by unobserved, had
heard parts of their sermons which usually consisted of the narration of some old
legend where people were enslaved by the infidels on account of their irreligious
life and practices; and end with an appeal to repentances saying that thus the
infidel may be driven away. [Ref. 65:vol. 1, p. 258]
Therefore, the religious activism of Sufis carries with it political activism. Lastly, Sufi
orders represent organizations which are structured similar to disciplined revolutionary
"cell groups" and can function as counterhegemonic societies - fulfilling or supplanting
State roles and functions.
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Soviet authorities have not succeeded in infiltrating the tariqa, neither can thev
win them over or destrov them. They are indeed the only social and political
mass organization in the' Soviet Union outside the Communist Party. To the
Muslim dissenters Sufism provides not onlv a corpus of ideals, symbols, beliefs
and techniques leading to God, but also a highly efficient organization with a
discipline stronger than that of the Communist Party itself. Its existence proves
that organized groups . . . can survive outside the Soviet system as closed
societies with their own ideologies, rules, education systems, justice and even
finance and victoriously challenge [the Soviet State]. [Ref. 52:p. 22]
Thus, Sufi orders are counterhegemonic apparatuses operating outside of Russian
national communist hegemony. They represent the strongest elements of the
counterhegemonic movement and contain the basic counterhegemonic superstructure
for Central Asian Muslim civil society.
Sufism is a very autocratic, centrally structured phenomena. The leaders of
Sufi orders - the ishans, unofficial mullahs, etc. - are what Gramsci would call "organic
intellectuals." Central Asian Sufi leaders are the Muslim "thinker-organizers" which
direct and manage the ideas and inspirations of Central Asia - the group to which they
"organically" belong. Sufi leaders maintain the survival of both the Islamic religion
and national culture. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay describes the function performed
by Sufi leaders as unoffical mullahs this way:
A religious creed depends upon the authoritative guidance of a class of
"technicians", namely clerics who are competent to perform the consecrated rites,
and who in the particular case of Islam would know enough Arabic to recite the
prayer? and read and explain the sacred texts. [Ref. 52:pp. 4-5]
Sufi leaders who lead Central Asia's "non-mosque" Islamic trend are intellectuals -
cleric intellectuals. They are also managers and technicians of a counterhegemonic
apparatus - Sufi orders. They also have a broad base of contact with civil society
through their "clerical" role as part of the life cycle rituals. Therefore, these Sufi
leaders are the organic intellectuals of the developing counterhegemony. But Sufi
leaders are not alone in providing leadership for the religiously and politically active
elements of society, and in motivating the passive elements. The Muslim traditional
intellectuals also are involved - developing a Central Asian national consciousness.
3. Central Asian Muslim Intellectuals
The Muslim intelligentsia in Central Asia are what Gramsci calls "traditional
intellectuals." For Gramsci, traditional intellectuals, like scholars, tend to function
autonomously and are not organically linked to their group of origin. While the
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Central Asian Muslim intellectuals are not quite as autonomous and as removed from
their Muslim origins as Gramsci might theorize, nevertheless they do function much
the same as his description of traditional intellectuals. Richard Pipes describes the
position of this intelligentsia as a unique blend of both Soviet and Muslim features,
and as a "transmission belt" of Soviet or Russian ideas to the masses.
The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses manv of the characteristics
which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, out in addition, it also
displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.
The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in peculiar position; by origin, language,
culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training,
work and much ot its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It
thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something oT a third
element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated
regime and the native population. [Ref. 6o:p. 305]
Thus the Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia has historically served as the Russian's
"deputies" - giving homogeneity and self-awareness to the dominant group, as well as
performing "subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government."
[Ref. 6:p.l2] Yet within this intelligentsia, the Central Asian Muslim intellectuals - the
scholars, historians, poets, novelists, artists, etc. - serve as a counterhegemonic
subgroup.
Central Asian Muslim intellectuals are actively involved in the assertion of
Central Asian cultural autonomy. Since World War II, Muslim intellectuals have been
filled
with a strong desire to rediscover the national past of its people ... of course
this search leads to the rediscovery of a common Muslim past ... for the simple
reason that there is no such thing as a purely Uzbek tradition, nor a purely
Karakalpak culture, and that when a KarakalpaK intellectual tries to discover his
origins he discovers a past common to all Turkic, or rather to all Muslim people.
[ReT. 67:p. 181]
This rediscovery and rehabilitation of the past aids the transethnic national
consciousness of Central Asians and reinforces their separate and even superior
non-Russian culture and heritage. Among the Central Asian elite, the feelings of
belonging to a Central Asian Millet has been cultivated by the slow but steady
rediscovery of the pre-Russian Revolution Central Asian past. This movement, called
"mirasism" (from the Arabic "miras" meaning "patrimony"), has brought about a
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resurgence of nationality oriented novels, the defense of Central Asian languages,53 the
writings of national histories, and the revitalization of Central Asian artistic and
literary expression (to name only a few examples). In this process of mirasism, Daniel
Matuszewski notes,
The Turkic peoples in the USSR have become increasingly assertive. Much of
the recent Turkic literature in the Soviet Union is nothing less than an attempt to
resurrect the past, a proud and accomplished past which had been forgotten or
suppressed in the political transformations of the first decades of the Soviet
period. [Ref. 17:p. 76]
Part of this Turkic miras literature attests not only to the difference between Central
Asian and Russian values but warns people not to abandon their native heritage by
assimilating into the Russian dominated Soviet culture. The historiography of
mirasism has even emphasized more "reactionary" native leaders who defended native
territories against invaders.
Through mirasism, Central Asian intellectuals not only can revitalize national
consciousness and heritage among the masses, but reconnect themselves to their
religious origins. Much of Central Asia's great poetry is Sufi influenced. In fact,
almost all the Turkestani poets in the 12th to the 18th century were Sufi adepts and
their works reflect a strong Sufi mysticism. Therefore,
Thanks to mirasism, Sufism has become more and more a central and crucial
part of growing national awareness . . . during the last two or three years, a new
trend has appeared in the cultural life of the Central Asian intelligentsia, a new
and constantly growing interest in the "people" (khalq), not onl>C as before, in
the rulers anci the great men. In Central Asia, more than elsewhere in the
Muslim world Sufism corresponds to the deepest layer of folk culture (Ahmed
Yasawi [a 12th century Sufi] was the first poet to write in a Turkic language),
because of this new "popularist" trend, Central Asian intellectuals trying to find
roots other than Russian or German Marxism discover the forbidden' beauties of
Islam and the glory of their national patrimony. It is not surprising that they
come to prefer the poems of Ahmed \asawi to Karl Marx's Das Kapiial or the
writing of Plekhanov. [Ref. 52:p. 30]
53An example of this is Erkin Vahidov's 1978 poem "My Mother Tongue is
Dying," [Ref. 68].
y
54For an interesting treatment of these literary "warnings" see [Ref. 69].
>5For a brief list of the main themes of mirasism, see [Ref. 39:pp. 62-63].
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Through mirasism, the normally less religious Central Asian intellectuals are
rediscovering and reexploring their Sufi roots. This trend should provide a greater
yoking together of nationalistic intellectuals and religious Sufi leaders. While
intellectuals have been involved in Sufism in the recent Soviet past, the current
mirasism trend should establish an even greater tie than before.
Looking back to Gramsci, this development of a greater Muslim traditional
intellectual and Muslim organic intellectual connection is essential for a developing
counterhegemony. The allying together of these two Muslim intellectual groups
provides the basis for a neo-Gramscian political strategy - the establishment of a
Central Asian Muslim cultural and moral superiority, independent of its direct political
power. For Gramsci, only after this cultural and moral superiority is established in a
counterhegemonic movement and a "war of position" is won does the movement need
to take on a more political emphasis in order to wrest political power away from the
State through a paramilitary, revolutionary "war of position." But in order for each of
these three counterhegemonic apparatuses - the Muslim family, Sufi orders and leaders,
and Central Asian Muslim intellectuals - to become transformed from part of a
counterhegemonic "war of position" to a "war of maneuver," a crisis in the Russian
hegemony must occur.
C. COUNTERHEGEMONIC FUTURE
Soviet Central Asia's counterhegemony is a developing counterhegemony. While
Sufi adepts represent the strongest elements of the counter-cultural movement, most
Central Asians are not as active. However, a Muslim contradictory consciousness
appears to exist on a broad basis within Central Asian civil society. What the future
requires for Central Asia's counterhegemony is to further develop the strength of the
movement and to win the battle for the Central Asian Muslim mind. While some
consider the lack of overt political aspirations or goals to be a flaw in any developing
revolutionary situation in Central Asia, the author's view asserts that this represents
not a flaw for Central Asia as much as a flaw in Western analysis. Gramsci's theories
rest on the need for two revolutions to displace State power. The first revolution only
fights cultural and ideological struggles trying to undercut the hegemonic rule of the
dominant group and force a greater State reliance upon coercion as opposed to
consensus. Following a "crisis in hegemony" or an "organic crisis" the
counterhegemony can transfer from a "war of position" strategy to a "war of
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maneuver." During a Central Asian "war of maneuver," political goals will become
more paramount. Are they trying to succeed, establish greater autonomy, seek an
improved political position? While these questions about political goals are useful,
they are not valid concerns until after the organic crisis. Since an organic crisis is not
just a specific moment in time but rather an extended moment of days, months or even
years, the counterhegemony will be able to "change gears" for the new "war."
Therefore, the most important concern today in evaluating the Central Asian
counterhegemonic future is to evaluate the prospects for an organic crisis in Central
Asia.
Gramsci emphasized that an organic crisis reflected the convergence of two
smaller crises - a crisis in the belief system and a crisis of the State. It can either be a
foreign-induced organic crisis - such as the strain of a foreign war, or a State-induced
organic crisis - such as the poor handling of a passive revolution, or a
structurally-induced organic crisis - such as an economic crisis or recession. Today,
most Western experts are of one of three opinions relating to a future Central Asian
crisis. The first is that the Soviets have no potential for any crisis in Central Asia
either now or in the future. The second opinion suggests that while Soviet control or
Russian hegemony is not absolute, it is strong enough to endure unless a
foreign-induced situation arises. Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup's conclusions
reflect this line of thought.
barring a major crisis - such as foreign war - the present status quo in the Soviet
Union will be uncompromisingly preserved as long as possible. The final
inescapable, violent crisis will be delayed, but for how long? [Ref. 2:p. 152J
The third opinion takes a domestic perspective, that either a State-induced situation -
e.g., a failed governmental reform - or a structurally-induced situation - e.g., the
surfacing of a fundamental contradiction or flaw within the structure of the Soviet
State or society - is capable of inducing an organic crisis. Brian D. Silver and William
O. McCagg, Jr.'s conclusions reflect this line of thought.
Social mobilization is the most important goal for the individual - improvement
of his own lot and that of his family, first, and only later improvement of his
whole community's lot. It is readily perceptible that this rule works two ways.
These three opinions are directed towards a general crisis in the region, but can
.s v
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also be related to a future organic crisis as well.
As long as a governing power in a multinational state can offer individuals more
than continued membership in an ethnic eroup can offer, assimilation or at least
subservient, political status is likely to Be accepted, even if this results in the
gradual extinction of the group. But once the balance tips - once the governing
power reaches the limits of its benevolence to individual citizens and begins to
seem oppressive or unresponsive to their perceived riehts or needs - then
"disintegration" will predictably occur and spread. [Ref. 70:p. xx]
In the first opinion, a foreign power's capability to incite an organic crisis is negligible,
in the second it is great, in the third it is not required. This paper argues throughout
against the first opinion; however, either the second or third appear feasible. While it
is difficult to predict foreign-induced situations like a war, or State-induced situations
like failed reforms, a neo-Gramscian perspective can explain why an organic crisis can
occur within the Soviet State without any outside assistance - i.e., a
structurally-induced organic crisis.
Currently, three factors tend to have a synergistic effect on structurally inducing
an organic crisis in the Soviet Union. First, the Central Asian population boom itself is
producing a structurally precarious situation. From a "Deutschian" perspective, one
could describe the situation as those mobilized into Central Asian society (via birth)
are multiplying at a more rapid rate than those assimilated into the larger, Soviet unit.
The conclusion, based on Karl Deutsch's work, is that Muslim society is growing faster
than Soviet community. Integration requires that the reverse be true that those
assimilated multiply at the more rapid rate to allow the community to grow faster than
society. [Ref. 71:p. 99] As long as the Muslim society continues to grow_faster, the
counterhegemony can eventually by sheer numbers "surround the State" and force an
organic crisis. But this Muslim population boom presents the Soviets with a corollary
problem - the growing surplus of labor inputs in Central Asia.
The second factor which contributes to a structurally-induced organic crisis is the
surplus labor supply in Central Asia, or more appropriately, the labor deficits in the
Soviet's European and Siberian regions. These regional labor shortages reflect the
overall shrinking of the Soviet labor force. In attempting to use the surplus labor
supply found in Central Asia, the Soviets face several significant obstacles. First,
Central Asian labor, traditionally low skilled, is qualitatively unfit to fill the Soviet's
future industrial needs. Additionally, Central Asians have been extremely resistant to
move, especially outside of their regional area, and redistribute the labor surplus to
labor deficit areas. Lastly, the Soviet's have been reluctant to move industry into this
region, preferring to allow Central Asians to remain primarily rural exporters of raw
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materials like cotton. The more immediate results of not correcting this labor supply
and demand problem will be a decline in Soviet economic development. Since the
Soviet State as a "modernizer," continually improving the technical efficiency with
which they use their mode of production, is essential to ensuring a preponderance of
consensus rule, any failure in this area weakens Russian hegemony. The majority
opinion among Western scholars on this subject is that this labor dilemma, caused
basically by cultural differences between Slavs and Muslims, will pose serious problems
for the Soviet Union. 57 Thus, this labor problem, if uncorrected, can lead to an
economic crisis and force a structurally induced organic crisis. On the other hand, if the
Soviets seek to forcibly redistribute this labor - i.e., an example of a poorly handled
domestic reform - this can also lead to a cultural clash and an organic crisis. In either
case, this labor problem can contribute to an organic crisis without relying on any
outside foreign assistance.
The third factor which contributes to a future structurally-induced organic crisis
does not relate to Central Asian Muslims at all. It relates to the resurgence of Russian
nationalism within the Soviet State. This resurgence is caused in part by the effects of
non-Russian mirasism on Russians. Roman Solchanyk sees an increasing concern
among some circles of the Russian intelligentsia with how "Russians, Russian history,
and the USSR in general are perceived by the outside world." [Ref. 75:p. 1] This
concern reflects Russian perceptions that the "Russianness" of their State is being
overlooked, and that the negative stereotype of Russians is "ostensibly widespread in
the West." [Ref. 75:p. 5] The conclusion, as Solchanyk sees it, is that
The Soviet preoccupation with nurturing a positive Russian image, on the one
hand, and warnings to the non-Russians not to "inflate" their achievements, on
the other, betrays a certain degree of insecurity in the Kremlin with regard to
both the Russian self-image ana the relationship between the Russians and the
non-Russians in the USSR. [Ref. 75:p. 5]
This emphasis on the Russianness of the Soviet State also produces various corollary
movements, such as a greater emphasis on Russian literacy in Central Asia [Ref. 76].
This new emphasis on Russian culture and heritage contributes to a
For a concise opinion of the major arguments involved in the Central Asian
labor .surplus dilemma, see Michael ilywkin's article [Ref. 72], which argues from a
majority viewpoint. For a minority position, arguing that modernization within
Centra] Asia will overcome cultural differences and that Central Asian labor is
primarily an economic issue without cultural overtones, see [Ref. 73]. Lastlv for a
Soviet opinion see Topilin's excellent study in its abridged, translated form [Ref 74].
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structurally-induced organic crisis. The Soviets' ablity to maneuver and make cultural
reforms that are pro-Islam are limited by Russian nationalism, and Russian
nationalism - backed by State power - can come into the growing counter-culture of
Central Asia.
These three factors are important because alone each could with time produce an
organic crisis. However, together they have a synergistic effect propelling the Central
Asian counterhegemony closer to an organic crisis. Additionally, these three together
can lead to the unravelling of Russian hegemony without an "Afghanistan War" or
United States involvement. Thus within the "State of nations" currently lie the
ingredients for its unravelling. While the Central Asian counterhegemony is not the
only such movement within the Soviet Union, it appears to be properly positioned to
win "the battle for the mind" which is so essential in any revolutionary or opposing
struggle against the Soviet State. We in the West would do well to consider the truth
of Wayne Vucinich's exhortation over twenty years ago:
The Soviet ideolosv must be fought not only on the political and military front,
but also on the cultural and educational front. [Ref. 77:p. 12]
Using a neo-Gramscian framework, one can see on which front the Central Asians are
currently fighting. The future for them remains a counterhegemonic one.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Soviet Union is facing a serious challenge from Central Asian Muslims to its
internal rule and domestic stability. This challenge, highlighted and analyzed by many
Western scholars, has often been articulated as separate or interrelated particularistic
problems. Even those works that attempt to discuss all of the major issues concerning
the Soviet Central Asian Muslim challenge are largely descriptive [Ref. 27]. Their
conclusions, which may be accurate, still lack a more universalistic theoretical basis.
The literature, which has come a long way from the times of "tourist" writings, has not
evolved very far from its scholarly beginnings in the 1950s. 58 As a result, while the
literature is very strong in and useful for description and explanation, it lacks a firm
theoretical foundation for prediction and prescription.
The purpose of this study has been to establish a theoretical foundation for
discussing the Soviet Central Asian challenge using Antonio Gramsci's theories of
hegemony and counterhegemony. While Gramsci, a Marxist and an historical
materialist, took a class-based approach to understanding the State, State rule and
revolution against a State, this author has inverted his approach for a non-Marxist
application. The fundamental key to applying Gramsci's theories and (neo-Gramscian
theories) is the mechanism for rule used by the dominant social group within civil
society. This mechanism, called hegemony, allows the dominant group to effect its rule
over subordinate groups. Hegemony, which is the cultural and ideological ascendancy
of the dominant group's social vision over the social vision of all other social groups,
permits a consensus-oriented rule. The subordinate groups, who should be alienated
by the State, have "bought into" the dominant groups Weltanschauung and are,
therefore, passive towards revolution. Gramsci sought to overcome this passivity
through counterhegemony and a "war of position." Only by providing an alternate
social vision based on the culture and values of the subordinate groups, can they
counter the hegemony of the dominant group. This vehicle, called counterhegemony,
was the basis for Gramsci's alternative revolutionary strategy. Only by staging a
CO
The "father of Western tourist" writings concerning Russian and Soviet Central
Asian Muslims is Euccne Schuvler [Ref. 651. For an analysis of the development of
early scholarly research bv Westerners on the Muslim issues of the Soviet Lnion see
Serge Zenkovsky's article [Ref. 78J.
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counterhegemonic revolution can the State's hegemonic rule be defeated. An initial
paramilitary revolution, called a "war of maneuver," would be both inappropriate and
unsuccessful in this situation. Only by first winning a counterhegemonic revolution,
called a "war of position," can the State be surrounded by people who no longer "buy
into" the dominant group's social vision. After a "war of position" has been won, a
"war of maneuver" can proceed successfully. Therefore, Gramsci has elevated the
"battle for the mind" to the position of preeminence within the revolutionary struggle.
Gramsci's theories provide the framework for evaluating the Soviet Central Asian
Muslim challenge as a "battle for the mind."
The Soviet Union is a "State of nations", hegemonically ruled by a single nation -
the Russian nation - through a national ideology - Russian national communism. The
dominant social division in the Soviet Union is national groups. The Russian nation is
the ruling nation, weaving its ideology and culture throughout the social fabric of
society. Communism serves as a useful ideology for Russian hegemony. Russian
hegemony pre-existed under Czarist rule. The Russian Revolution in 1917 was a social
revolution of the class structure of civil society, but only a passive revolution of
Russian rule. As a result, capitalistic elements were eradicated from society while
Russian rule was maintained through Russian national communists. The Communist
Party institutionalized the joining together of this new ideology - communism - with
traditional Russian chauvinism. The Russian nation became the "vanguard nation"
within the Soviet "State
_of nations." While Soviet rule has changed throughout the
almost seventy years of Russian communism, Russian hegemony has continued to play
a foundational role - permeating the State. The Soviet State functions in three primary
roles to maintain its rule: an educator, a modernizer, and a dictator. While in the
early days the State was very much a dictatorship based on a conflictual model of
society, it laid the basis for a later emphasis on educator and modernizer roles. Today,
the Russian hegemonic rule is based on a dominance of consensus rule using the
educator and modernizer roles, with the dictatorial role reserved for the rebellious
"fringe" elements. Nevertheless, in Soviet Central Asia that consensus is being
threatened by the "contradictory consciousness" of the Muslim people. The Russians
appear to be losing the "battle for the Central Asian mind."
Soviet Central Asian Muslims are counterhegemonicly challenging Russian
hegemony. While the challenge is isolated largely to the geographic area of Central
Asia, it does seriously threaten the stability of the Soviet State. The challenge involves
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three key areas. First, the rapidly growing Muslim population of Central Asia is
presenting the Soviets with a demographic imbalance. Yet this demographic boom
reflects a fundamental difference between Russian Slavic values and Central Asian
Muslim values. At the heart of this Muslim value system lies Islam. Both official
Islam and unofficial "parallel" Islam shape the Central Asian's contradictory
consciousness. In a state where religion is supposed to be dying, Islam is not.
Regardless of individual beliefs, Central Asians are continuing to follow an Islamic
value system. Lastly, Central Asia has had a long historic tradition that is being
rediscovered by the Central Asians themselves. While the Russians succeeded in
subdividing Russian Turkestan into separate republics, it has not abnegated the
national consciousness of the region. Islam serves as a unifier of the Central Asian
consciousness - Uzbek, Turkomen, Kirghiz, and Tajik ethnic identities forming a single,
multifaceted, transethnic national identity. This is the significant "we" in the area and
is opposed to the Russian "they". Islam and national identity are two elements tightly
woven together, very similar to Russian Communism. The resulting national identity
in Central Asia, therefore, is both religious and national. Therefore just as Russian
hegemony is both cultural and ideological, Muslim-Turkestani culture and the Islamic
religion provide the basis for Soviet Central Asia's counterhegemony.
The key elements which propel this war of position along are the family unit
itself, the unofficial Mullahs or Sufi leaders, and the Central Asian Muslim
intellectuals. _The Muslim family serves as the primary counterhegemonic apparatus.
The Sufi leaders and the Central Asian Muslim intellectuals form Gramsci's organic
and traditional intellectuals - leading the movement along by providing the
continuation of Islamic practices and the rediscovery of an historic national past.
Finally, Central Asia's population growth itself is sufficient to propel the Soviet
State into a crisis of hegemony - an organic crisis. By the year 2000, every second
Soviet birth will be a Muslim child - most likely a Central Asian Muslim child.
Demographics alone are sufficient to allow this counterhegemony to surround the
Soviet State's hegemonic apparatuses. However, if the Soviets fail to use this growing
Central Asian labor surplus, they may face an economic crisis prior to the
counterhegemony's surrounding the State. Because Russian hegemony relies so heavily
on the national assimilation produced by economic modernization, this growing
Central Asian labor surplus itself can produce a structurally-induced organic crisis.
Either way, by demographics alone or with an accompanying economic crisis, Central
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Asians can wage and potentially win a "war of position" within the Soviet Union.
Therefore, while the Soviet Union today appears protected against a "war of maneuver"
similar to the Basmachi Revolt of the 1920s and 1930s, it does appear extremely
vulnerable to a "war of position." In this light, Stalin's provisions for the stability of
the Soviet system appear misdirected.
In our Soviet country we must evolve a system of government which will permit
us with certainty to anticipate all changes, to perceive everything that is going on
among peasants, the non-Russian nationals and the Russians; the svstem of
barometers which will anticipate every chanse, register and forestall a Basmachi
movement, . . . and all possible storms and nT-fortune [Ref. 79:p. 29].
Today's threat is not a Basmachi "war of maneuver" but a Central Asian Muslim "war
of position." Counterhegemony may allow the Central Asians to succeed in freeing
themselves from Russia's rule. In light of Gramsci's theory and its application to
Russian hegemony and Central Asia's developing counterhegemony, Michael Rywkin's
prediction concerning Moscow's Muslim challenge appears dangerously accurate for
the Russians themselves.
The Basmachi cavalry is not about to descend into the vallevs and cities of
Central Asia to challenge the Russian; but the growing weight of geopolitical
circumstances, demographic reality, and Muslim ethnic "innate drives" will
increasingly do so, in a less dramatic but no less dangerous way [Ref. 27:p. 152].
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